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Abstract
We consider the control of the COVID–19 pandemic via incentives, through either stochastic SIS or SIR com-
partmental models. When the epidemic is ongoing, the population can reduce interactions between individuals in
order to decrease the rate of transmission of the disease, and thus limit the epidemic. However, this effort comes
at a cost for the population. Therefore, the government can put into place incentive policies to encourage the lock-
down of the population. In addition, the government may also implement a testing policy in order to know more
precisely the spread of the epidemic within the country, and to isolate infected individuals. We provide numerical
examples, as well as an extension to a stochastic SEIR compartmental model to account for the relatively long
latency period of the COVID–19 disease. The numerical results confirm the relevance of a tax and testing policy to
improve the control of an epidemic. More precisely, if a tax policy is put into place, even in the absence of a specific
testing policy, the population is encouraged to significantly reduce its interactions, thus limiting the spread of the
disease. If the government also adjusts its testing policy, less effort is required on the population side, so individuals
can interact almost as usual, and the epidemic is largely contained by the targeted isolation of positively–tested
individuals.
Key words. COVID–19, stochastic epidemic models, epidemic control, optimal incentives, moral hazard, com-
partment model.
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1 Introduction
Starting around 430 BC, and known as the first historically well–documented epidemic, the Plague of Athens killed
between a quarter and a third of Athenians, as reported by Thucydides. He described the reaction of common
Athenians and physicians of the time alike in these terms
For a while physicians, in ignorance of the nature of the disease, sought to apply remedies; but it was in
vain, and they themselves were among the first victims, because they oftenest came into contact with it.
No human art was of any avail, and as to supplications in temples, inquiries of oracles, and the like, they
were utterly useless, and at last men were overpowered by the calamity and gave them all up. (Jowett [60,
Volume I, Book II, pp. 135])
Thucydides analysed the consequences of this epidemic, and concluded that it had led a moral upheaval for the
Athenians, faced with the complete lack of any useful cure. Indeed, they realised that their traditionally used policies
(mostly of a religious nature) to face tragedies had no effect on the epidemic, and that in the end, the disease was
only stopped thanks to the development of a natural immunity within the population, during the first four years of
the epidemic phase. Concerning now more specifically the spread of the disease itself, Thucydides wrote the following
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Appalling too was the rapidity with which men caught the infection; dying like sheep if they attended on
one another; and this was the principal cause of mortality. When they were afraid to visit one another,
the sufferers died in their solitude, so that many houses were empty because there had been no one left
to take care of the sick; or if they ventured they perished, especially those who aspired to heroism. For
they went to see their friends without thought of themselves and were ashamed to leave them, at a time
when the very relations of the dying were at last growing weary and ceased even to make lamentations,
overwhelmed by the vastness of the calamity. (Jowett [60, Volume I, Book II, pp. 138])
In Thucydides’s analysis of the Plague of Athens, we can isolate three fundamental questions that need to be addressed
whenever an unknown epidemic occurs.
(1) How can one model a disease when one has, at best, parsimonious information on how it is spreading among the
population?
(2) How can one solve the Gordian knot associated to interactions within the population: enjoying on the one
hand the presence of others and avoiding isolation and solitude, and on the other hand potentially dramatically
spreading the disease?
(3) How can governments and decisions–makers incentivise people in order to better control the spread of the
epidemic?
The first question is naturally linked to several strands of fundamental research, both for mathematicians and physi-
cians, dealing with the problem of choosing a relevant epidemic model. If the paternity of the first mathematical
model designed to describe the evolution of an epidemic is often attributed to Bernoulli, who proposed one for small-
pox as early as 1760 in [17], the real mathematical development of the theory had to wait for the 20th century, with
fundamental contributions for the development of deterministic models by Hamer [52], Ross [88; 89; 90], Soper [98],
and later Kermack and McKendrick [64], McKendrick [75], and Bartlett [13] who proposed one of the first general
investigations of the evolution of deterministic interacting systems, which was then applied to epidemiology in Kendall
[63]. The previous list is by no means comprehensive, and we refer the interested reader to the monograph by Bailey
[12] for more historical details. It was rapidly noticed that deterministic models were insufficient to account for the
uncertainty associated the disease spreading, and the technical difficulties usually encountered for its detection. This
acknowledgement helped nurturing the development of stochastic models, whose first instances seems to be traced
back to McKendrick [74] and Greenwood [48]. For a precise comparison between deterministic and stochastic models
in discrete–time settings, we refer our readers to Bailey [12], Bartlett [14], and Allen and Burgin [5], and to Allen [4]
for more up–to–date references and an overview of recent epidemiological models.
We will now describe some specific type of epidemiological models, belonging to the general class of compartmental
models, and which will be at the heart of our work. The first one considers a sort of worst–case scenario, in which
an immunity is not developed after infection. This is specially relevant for instance for some sexually transmitted
infections, or bacterial diseases. In such a case, infected people can either die of the infection, or be cured and therefore
become once more susceptible to contract the disease. Such models have been coined SIS (for Susceptible–Infected–
Susceptible), and consider a population divided into two groups. Susceptible individuals interact with infected ones,
and therefore move from one class to the other repeatedly. This model was first discussed in Weiss and Dishon
[106], generalising a simpler version by Bailey [11], where it was linked to birth and death interacting processes. It
was then further studied by Kryscio and Lefèvre [67], who computed the mean time of extinction of the infection.
These discrete–time models were then extended by Nåsell [78; 79], who found the quasi–stationary distribution of a
continuous–time stochastic SIS model with no births nor deaths. More recently, Gray, Greenhalgh, Hu, Mao, and Pan
[47] proposed to model a stochastic SIS process in continuous–time, as a solution to a bi–dimensional SDE driven by
a Brownian motion. This is the model we will follow in our SIS framework.
Alternatively to this quite pessimistic scenario, one can also assume that an immunity will appear after infection. In
that case, we can distinguish three classes: susceptible individuals who can contract the disease, infected people who
are currently infected by the disease, and recovered people who have been cured and developed antibodies. Introduced
originally by Kermack and McKendrick [64], this so–called SIR model was studied in depth by Anderson and May
[8] in a deterministic setting, while stochastic perturbations were introduced by Beretta, Kolmanovskii, and Shaikhet
[16]. Modelling a stochastic SIR process as a solution to an SDE driven by a Brownian motion was then proposed in
Tornatore, Buccellato, and Vetro [103], and Jiang, Yu, Ji, and Shi [59]. This will be our model choice in this case.
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For a more realistic modelling in the case of the COVID–19 disease, and especially to account for the relatively long
latent phase of this disease, one could also assume that once a susceptible individual contracts the disease, he does
not immediately become contagious. This led us to provide some extensions of our reasoning, in particular to a SEIR
model, used by Bacaër [10], Dolbeault and Turinici [32] and Élie, Hubert, and Turinici [38] to model the COVID–19
disease. In this type of models, an intermediary class between susceptible and infected is introduced, usually referred
to as the class of exposed individuals. This class allows to model individual infected but not yet infectious. Similarly
as for the SIR/SIS models, another variation on this model considers that there is only a partial immunity, and
individuals having recovered may revert to the class of susceptible: in this case, the model is usually coined SEIRS.
In our framework we need to consider continuous–time stochastic version of these models, and will therefore use the
ones introduced in Mummert and Otunuga [77].
The question of the model being now settled, we can focus more on the second question raised above, which is linked
to the spread of the disease through interactions within the population. In classical SIS/SIR models, the infection
grows into the population through an incidence rate β, and proportionally to the product of the number of susceptible
and infected individuals. In the absence of a cure or a vaccine, this transmission rate appears therefore as the only
control variable of individual or public institutions, in order to reduce the spread of an epidemic. Our take on the
second question will therefore be from a control–theoretic perspective. At the heart of this approach is the simple
idea that when faced with an epidemic, a perfectly rational population will try to find an equilibrium interaction rate,
balancing the need to still connect with others, and the natural fear of spreading the infection itself. This is by no
means a new point of view, and papers discussing the use of formal control theory in epidemiology can be dated back
to the 70s, see among others Taylor [100], Jaquette [58], Sanders [92], Gupta and Rink [50; 51], Abakuks [1], Morton
and Wickwire [76], Wickwire [107], or Sethi and Staats [97]. More recently and closer to our purpose, we can also
refer to Behncke [15], Riley et al. [87], who studied the impact of the control of transmission rate on the 2002–2004
SARS outbreak in Hong Kong and on the ways to interfere with the disease spreading, Piunovskiy and Clancy [84],
Hansen and Day [53], Fenichel et al. [39], Kandhway and Kuri [61], Sélley, Besenyei, Kiss, and Simon [96], and more
broadly to the monograph by Lenhart and Workman [69].
An important, and slightly unrealistic aspect of the framework we just described is that the population is perfectly
rational. Though it seems reasonable to assume that at least some individuals, being afraid of getting sick, will
naturally decrease their interaction rates, it would however clearly be a stretch to assume that all individuals will
have access to enough information, compared for instance to public institutions, for them to assess whether they are
really acting in a way which is truly beneficial to the population as a whole. This is one of the reasons why quarantine
and lockdown measures can be in addition introduced by governments, in order to help slow down a pandemic, when
no cure nor vaccine have been developed, and there is a risk for medical facilities to be overwhelmed by a large
influx of patients. As should be expected, a significant part of the recent literature on the COVID–19 pandemic has
also adopted this point of view, and such measures as well as their medical, societal, and economical impacts are
discussed by, among others, Alvarez, Argente, and Lippi [6], Anderson, Heesterbeek, Klinkenberg, and Hollingsworth
[9], Colbourn [24], Del Rio and Malani [30], Djidjou-Demasse, Michalakis, Choisy, Sofonea, and Alizon [31], Élie,
Hubert, and Turinici [38], Ferguson et al. [40], Fowler, Hill, Levin, and Obradovich [41], Grigorieva, Khailov, and
Korobeinikov [49], Hatchimonji, Swendiman, and Seamon [54], Kantner [62], Ketcheson [65], Piguillem and Shi [83],
Thunstrom, Newbold, Finnoff, Ashworth, and Shogren [101], Toda [102], or Wilder-Smith, Chiew, and Lee [108].
A telling example in the above list is the report of the Imperial College London by Ferguson et al. [40], which assesses
the impact of non–pharmaceutical interventions to reduce the contact rate within a population for the COVID–
19 pandemic. They distinguish between mitigation strategies (i.e. reduction of the peak hospitalisation levels by
protecting the most susceptible individual from getting infected, with shelter in place policies or social distancing),
and suppression strategies (i.e. aiming at reversing the disease growth with home isolation and social distancing for
the entire population). It has been showed that mitigation policies ‘might reduce deaths seen in the epidemic by up to
half, and peak healthcare demand by two–thirds,’ (Ferguson et al. [40, pp. 15]) but will lead to numerous deaths and
saturation of health systems. The suppression strategy thus appears in this report as a preferred policy. In light of the
issues we have raised, a natural conclusion was, at least for us, that even if a control–theoretic approach to mitigate
the impact of an epidemic is clearly desirable, there is a priori no evidence that in face of clear public policies, a
population will directly adopt a social distancing behaviour leading to an optimal transmission rate for the welfare of
the society. Moreover, in the absence of a system allowing to actually keep track of the level of interaction within the
population, governments are faced with a clear situation of moral hazard.1 Consequently, an incentive policy should
1It is worth pointing out here that several countries worldwide have decided to use contact–tracing tools, such as mobile phone apps,
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also be calibrated by governments in order to get a better control on the spread of the disease. This, as expected,
leads us to our third question, which is where our approach departs significantly from the extant literature.
The COVID–19 pandemic has emphasised that a control policy has to be established with penalties, if lockdown
measures are not respected by the population. However, such policy is subject to two mains issues. First, regardless of
the amount of police checks being put into place, it is impossible for large countries to ensure the application of such
isolation measures, and therefore it is unfeasible to have an absolute control on the behaviour of all individuals and
their interactions. Second, a balance has to be stricken between the severity of penalties or other type of incentives
to help reduce the propagation of the disease, and the natural yearning of citizens for interactions. To the best of our
knowledge, no real calibration, founded on quantitative criteria, of appropriate incentive policies has been investigated
in epidemiological models.2 The present paper proposes to fulfil this gap by studying how a lockdown policy, seen as
a suppression strategy to echo [40], can limit the number of infected people during an epidemic, with uncertainties on
the actual number of affected individuals, and on their level of adherence to such a policy. More specially, we aim at
solving this moral hazard problem by finding
(i) the best reaction effort of the population to reduce the interaction given a specific government policy;
(ii) the optimal policy composed by an aggregated tax paid by the population at some fixed maturity, and a testing
policy to reduce the uncertainty on the estimated number of infected people.
As we already mentioned, this problem perfectly fits with a classical principal–agent problem with moral hazard, and
boils down to finding a Stackelberg equilibrium between the principal (the leader, here the government) proposing a
policy to an agent (the follower, here the population) to interact optimally in order to reduce the spread of the disease.
Principal–agent problems have a long history in the economics literature, dating back from, at least, the 60s. It is not
our goal here to review the whole literature on the subject, and we refer the interested reader to the seminal books
by Laffont and Martimort [68], Bolton and Dewatripont [19], or Salanié [91]. For our purpose here, we will content
ourselves to mention that this literature regained a strong momentum in the past two decades, where continuous–
time models where developed and showed to be more flexible and tractable than the earlier static or discrete–time
models. Main contributors in these regards are Holmström and Milgrom, [55], Schättler and Sung [95], Sannikov [93],
Williams [109], see also the monograph by Cvitanić and Zhang [27]. More recently, Cvitanić, Possamaï, and Touzi
[28; 29] developed a general theory allowing to tackle a great number of contract–theory problem, which has been then
extended and applied in many different situations3. The basic idea is to identify a sub–class of contracts offered by
the principal, which are revealing in the sense that the best–reaction function of the agent, and his optimal control,
can be computed straightforwardly, and then proving that restricting one’s attention to this class is without loss of
generality. With this approach, the problem faced by the principal now becomes a standard optimal control problem.
There are however two fundamental assumptions for this theory to work, one of them being a specific structure
condition, which enforces that the drift of the process controlled by the agent, meaning here for us the pair (S, I)
giving the number of susceptible and infected people in the population, must be in the range of the volatility matrix
of this process. This fundamental assumption is not satisfied in our model, because roughly speaking, there is only
one Brownian motion driving the two processes, and we therefore cannot directly rely on existing result to tackle
our problem. In these so–called degenerate problems, the literature has so far relied on the Pontryagin stochastic
maximum principle, see for instance [56], but this requires extremely stringent assumptions, such as linear dynamics,
which are automatically precluded for SIS/SIR models. We however prove that in our specific problem, it is possible
designed to help tracking down subsequent exposures after an infected individual is identified, see for instance Cho, Ippolito, and Yu [23],
or Reichert, Brack, and Scheuermann [86]. Using these would in principle erase any possibility or moral hazard, provided that all the
population uses the app, and that testing is organised on a massive scale. Even admitting that this would be the case, it remains that these
tools have raised complex issues of privacy, see Ienca and Vayena [57] or Park, Choi, and Ko [82], and thus are still extremely polemical.
In any case, the incentive–based approach we propose can always be considered as a useful complement to any other adopted strategy.
2There are a certain number of papers studying disease spreading through the lens of either moral hazard or adverse selection. However,
these papers are mostly interested in livestock related diseases, where producers naturally have private information on preventive measures
they may have adopted, prior to contamination (ex ante moral hazard), and may or may not declare whether their herd is infected after
contamination (ex post adverse selection). Such issues and the design of appropriate policies are considered for instance in Valeeva and
Backus [104], Gramig, Horan, and Wolf [45; 46], but the problematic is completely different from the one we are interested in. A notable
exception can be found in the work of Carmona and Wang [22, Section 5], where the authors consider an application of their moral hazard
theory for agents interacting through a finite state mean–field game to the containment of an epidemic.
3See among others Aïd, Possamaï, and Touzi [2], Alasseur, Farhat, and Saguan [3], El Euch, Mastrolia, Rosenbaum, and Touzi [33],
Cvitanić and Xing [26], Élie and Possamaï [35], Élie, Mastrolia, and Possamaï [37], Élie, Hubert, Mastrolia, and Possamaï [36], Kharroubi,
Lim, and Mastrolia [66], Lin, Ren, Touzi, and Yang [72], Mastrolia and Ren [73].
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to identity a whole family of contract representations (unlike the unique one in non–degenerate models), which is
different from the one obtained in [29], but which still allows us to re–interpret the problem of the principal as a
standard stochastic control problem. As far as we know, ours is the first paper in the literature which uses a dynamic
programming approach to solve a degenerate principal–agent problem, and this constitutes our main mathematical
contribution.
Unfortunately, but of course expectedly for a relatively general framework, there is no way to extract from our
model explicit results, especially on the shape of optimal controls. It is therefore necessary to perform numerical
simulations, by implementing semi–Lagrangian schemes, proposed for the first time by Camilli and Falcone [21], using
some truncated high–order interpolators, as proposed by Warin [105]. The numerical results for both SIS and SIR
models are conclusive, and confirm the relevance of a tax and testing policy to improve the control of an epidemic.
First, in the benchmark case, considered as the case where the government does not put into place a specific policy,
the efforts of the population are not sufficient to contain the epidemic. In our opinion, this supports the need for
incentives. Indeed, if a tax policy is put into place, even in the absence of a specific testing policy, the population is
then encouraged to significantly reduce its interactions, thus containing the epidemic until the end of the period under
consideration. However, for a fixed containment period, the population relaxes its effort at the very end, leading to
a resumption of the epidemic at that point. Finally, if the government also adjusts its testing policy, less effort is
required on the population side, so individuals can interact almost in a business–as–usual fashion, and the epidemic
is largely contained by the targeted isolation of positively–tested individuals.
Notations. We let N? be the set of positive integers, R+ := [0,∞) and R?+ := (0,∞). We fix a time horizon T > 0
corresponding to the lockdown length chosen, a priori, by the government. For every n ∈ N?, Sn represents the set
of n× n symmetric positive matrices with real entries. We also denote by Cn the space of continuous functions from
[0, T ] into Rn, and simplify notations when n = 1 by setting C := C1. The set Cn will always be endowed with the
topology associated to the uniform convergence on the compact [0, T ]. For every finite dimensional Euclidean space
E, and any n ∈ N?, we let Cb(E,R) be the space of bounded, continuous functions from E to R, as well as Cnb (E,R)
the subset of Cb(E,R) of all n–times continuously differentiable functions on E, with bounded derivatives. For every
ϕ ∈ C2b (E,R), we denote by ∇ϕ its gradient vector, and by D2ϕ its Hessian matrix.
2 Informal pandemic models and main results
In this section, in order to highlight the results we obtained throughout this paper, we present our model in an informal
way. We thus detail the compartmental epidemic models we consider to represent the spreading of the virus, i.e.,
either a SIS or a SIR model. Indeed, at the beginning of an epidemic, it is unlikely that decision–makers, let alone
the population, will have sufficient data to conclude that infected individuals become immune to the virus in question
once they have recovered. This is particularly the case when the virus is new, as in the case of the COVID–19.
With this in mind, we concentrate our attention to two classical models in epidemiology: the SIS model, for the case
where infected individuals do not develop an immunity to the disease, and can therefore re–contract it, and the SIR
model in the opposite case. Our study is therefore able to deal with both models, and one of the important points
will be to compare the results obtained for each of them. We insist on the fact that this entire section is informal, and
the reader is referred to Section 4 for the rigorous mathematical study.
2.1 Deterministic SIS/SIR dynamics with controlled transmission rate
Some parameters will be common in the considered models. In particular, they both involve four non–negative
parameters, λ, µ, β and γ. The parameters λ and µ represent respectively the birth and (natural) death rates among
the population, and therefore reflect the demographic dynamics unrelated to the epidemic4, while γ represents the
death rate associated to the disease. All these parameters are assumed to be constant and exogenous. In most
epidemic models, the parameter β, representing the transmission rate of the disease, is also assumed to be constant
and exogenous. Nevertheless, in our framework, we will consider that β is endogenous and time–dependent, in order
to model the influence that the population can have on this transmission rate.
4It should be noted that if the length of the epidemic is relatively short in relation to the life expectancy at birth in the concerned
country, the demographic dynamics become less relevant and may be dismissed altogether, by setting λ = µ = 0. Nevertheless, for the
sake of generality, we choose to take these dynamics into account, in order to allow for a straightforward application of our study to other
types of epidemics.
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More precisely, the transmission rate β depends essentially on two factors: the disease characteristics and the contact
rate within the population. Although the population cannot modify the disease characteristics, each individual can
choose (or be incentivised) to reduce his/her contact rate with other individuals in the population. We will thus assume
that the population can control the transmission rate β of the disease, by reducing social interactions. With this in
mind, we will denote by β > 0 the constant initial transmission rate of the disease, i.e., without any control measures
or effort from the population. Unfortunately, reducing social interactions is costly for the population. This cost takes
into account both the obvious social cost, due to accrued isolation during the lockdown period, and an economic cost
(loss of employment due to the lockdown,...). From now on, β will thus denote the time–dependent transmission
rate of the disease, controlled by the population. More precisely, we fix some constant βmax ≥ β representing the
maximum rate of interaction that can be considered, and we define B := [0, βmax]. The process β will be assumed to
be B–valued, and we will denote by B the corresponding set of processes.5
2.1.1 No known immunity: the SIS model
One of the two epidemic models we will study is inspired by the well–known SIS (Susceptible–Infected–Susceptible)
compartment model, which mainly considers two classes S and I within the population: the class S represents the
‘Susceptible’, while the class I represents the ‘Infected’. In this model, during the epidemic, each individual can be
either susceptible or infected, and (St, It) denotes the proportion of each category at time t ≥ 0. More precisely,
as in classical SIS models, we assume that an infected individual returns, after recovery, to the class of susceptible
individuals, and can therefore re–contract the disease. We denote by ν the associated rate, which is assumed to be
a non–negative constant. We also take into account the demographic dynamics of the population, i.e., births and
deaths (related to the considered disease or not), through the previously mentioned parameters λ, µ and γ. To sum
up, the model is represented in Figure 1 below, and the (continuous–time) evolution of the disease is described by the
following system dSt =
(
λ− µSt + νIt − βtStIt
)
dt,
dIt = −
(
(µ+ ν + γ)It − βtStIt
)
dt,
for t ∈ [0, T ], (2.1)
for an initial compartmental distribution of individuals at time 0, denoted by (s0, i0) ∈ R2+, supposed to be known.
Susceptible Infected
Death
λdt
βtStItdt
(µ+ γ)ItdtµStdt
νItdt
Figure 1: SIS model with demographic dynamics
2.1.2 Immunity after infection: the SIR model
The second epidemic model we will focus on is the classical SIR (Susceptible–Infected–Recovered) compartment model.
As in the SIS model, the class S represents the ‘Susceptible’ and the class I represents the ‘Infected’. The SIR model
is used to describe epidemics in which infected individuals develop immunity to the virus. This therefore involves a
third class, namely R, representing the ‘Recovered’, i.e., individuals who have contracted the disease, are now cured,
and therefore immune to the virus under consideration. We denote by ρ the recovery rate, which is assumed to be
a fixed non–negative constant. Therefore, during the epidemic, each individual can be either susceptible, infected or
recovery, and (St, It, Rt) denotes the proportion of each category at time t ≥ 0. As in the previously described SIS
model, we also take into account the demographic dynamics of the population, through the parameters λ, µ and γ.
To sum up, the epidemic scheme is represented in Figure 2, and the (continuous–time) evolution of the disease is
5We refer to Section 4.1.2 for a more precise definition of the set B, taking into account the information flow in the model.
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described by the following system
dSt =
(
λ− µSt − βtStIt
)
dt,
dIt = −
(
(µ+ γ + ρ)It − βtStIt
)
dt,
dRt = (ρIt − µRt)dt
for t ∈ [0, T ], (2.2)
for a given initial distribution of individuals at time 0, denoted by (s0, i0, r0) ∈ R3+ and assumed to be known.
Susceptible Infected
Death
Recoveryλdt
βtStItdt
(γ + µ)Itdt
µStdt
ρItdt
µRtdt
Figure 2: SIR model with demographic dynamics
2.2 Uncertainty and testing policy
The use of a deterministic model is widespread and generally justified for most epidemics. However, in our case study,
and given what is currently happening in many countries, it appears that the number of infected individuals is not so
simple to quantify and estimate. Indeed, without a large testing campaign, it seems complicated to know precisely
the proportion of infected in the population. This is particularly true in the case of the COVID–19 epidemic: the
absence of symptoms for a significant proportion of infected individuals leads to uncertainty about the actual number
of susceptible and infected.
As a consequence, it seems more realistic in our study to turn both the SIS and SIR deterministic controlled models
previously described, into stochastic controlled models. Concerning the deterministic part, the dynamics written in
the previous systems remain identical. The volatility is partly represented by a fixed and deterministic parameter
σ > 0, and by a time–dependent process α, representing the actions of the government in terms of testing policy. More
precisely, in our model, an increase of the number of tests in the population, represented by a decrease of the parameter
α, leads to a decrease in the volatility of the processes S and I. Hence, both the population and the government have
a clearer view of the number of susceptible and infected, and thus on the epidemic. However, this strategy comes at
an economic cost for the government. We then assume that, without any specific effort of the government, α is equal
to 1. We also fix a small parameter ε ∈ (0, 1) to consider the subset A := [ε, 1].6 The control α of the government is
assumed to be A–valued, and we denote by A the corresponding set of processes.7
In addition, the testing policy allows the government to isolate individuals with positive test results. Therefore, the
control α also has an impact on the effective transmission rate of the disease. More precisely, without any testing
policy, i.e. α = 1, the government cannot isolate contaminated individuals efficiently. In this case, all infected people
spread the disease, and the transmission rate of the virus is given by β. Conversely, if a testing policy is put into place
by the government, i.e. when α < 1, we consider that individuals with positive test results can be isolated, and as a
consequence less infected people spread the disease. In this case, the effective transmission rate is lower. We however
do not assume that the impact of the testing policy on the volatility of S and I, and on the transmission rate has the
same magnitude. Indeed, we expect a lower reduction of the effective transmission rate, compared to the volatility
reduction for a given policy α. This should be understood as a manifestation of the fact that it is easier to reduce the
uncertainty on the number of infected people, compared to actually isolate individuals who have been identified as
infected. We thus assume a linear dependency with respect to α for the volatility of both S and I, while the effective
transmission rate is chosen equal to β
√
α, so that the number of infected people spreading the disease at time t is
given by
√
αIt.
6The lower bound ε is here to insist on the fact that it is not possible, or prohibitively expensive, to cancel completely the uncertainty
linked to the disease’s dynamics, by taking α to be 0.
7We refer to Section 4.1 for the rigorous definition of the set A.
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We can now consider the SIS model previously defined by (2.1), but in its stochastic version: the number of infected,
and therefore the number of susceptible, are impacted at each time t by a Brownian motion Wt. More precisely, the
dynamic of the epidemic is now given by the following system
St = s0 +
∫ t
0
(
λ− µSs + νIs − βs√αsSsIs
)
ds+
∫ t
0
σαsSsIsdWs, t ∈ [0, T ],
It = i0 −
∫ t
0
(
(µ+ ν + γ)Is − βs√αsSsIs
)
ds−
∫ t
0
σαsSsIsdWs, t ∈ [0, T ].
(2.3)
Similarly to the SIS model, we consider that the deterministic model SIR described by (2.2) is also subject to a noise
in the estimation of the proportion of susceptible and infected individuals. Inspired by the stochastic SIR model in
Tornatore, Buccellato, and Vetro [103], the dynamic of the epidemic is now given by the following system
St = s0 +
∫ t
0
(
λ− µSs − βs√αsSsIs
)
ds+
∫ t
0
σαsSsIsdWs, t ∈ [0, T ],
It = i0 −
∫ t
0
(
(µ+ ρ+ γ)Is − βs√αsSsIs
)
ds−
∫ t
0
σαsSsIsdWs, t ∈ [0, T ],
Rt = r0 +
∫ t
0
(ρIs − µRs)ds, t ∈ [0, T ].
(2.4)
Note that the proportion R of individuals in recovery is also uncertain, but only through its dependency with respect
to I. More precisely, we assume that there is no uncertainty on the recovery rate ρ, implying that if the proportion of
infected individual is perfectly known, the proportion of recovered is also known without uncertainty. This modelling
choice is consistent with most stochastic SIR models, and emphasises that the major uncertainty in the current
epidemic is related to the non–negligible proportion of (nearly) asymptomatic individuals. Indeed, an asymptomatic
individual may be mis–classified as susceptible. This is also the case for an individual in recovery, who has been
asymptomatic, but the uncertainty is solely related to the fact that he was not classified as infected when he actually
was.
In order to provide a unified framework for both the SIS and SIR models, and simplify the presentation, we will
consider the following dynamic for the epidemic
St = s0 +
∫ t
0
(
λ− µSs + νIs − βs√αsSsIs
)
ds+
∫ t
0
σαsSsIsdWs, t ∈ [0, T ],
It = i0 −
∫ t
0
(
(µ+ ν + γ + ρ)Is − βs√αsSsIs
)
ds−
∫ t
0
σαsSsIsdWs, t ∈ [0, T ],
Rt = r0 −
∫ t
0
(ρIs − µRs)ds, t ∈ [0, T ].
(2.5)
Notice that to recover the SIS model, one has to set ρ = 0, and conversely, ν = 0 to obtain the SIR model.
2.3 Incentive policies
In addition to the choice of a testing policy, the government can also incentivise the population to limit their social
interactions, in order to decrease the transmission rate of the disease, by introducing financial penalties. More precisely,
at time 0, the government informs the population about its testing policy α ∈ A, as well as its fine policy χ ∈ C8,
for the lockdown period [0, T ]. Knowing this, the population will choose an interacting behaviour according to the
following rules:
(i) an increase in the tax lowers its utility;
(ii) an increase in the level of interaction (up to a specific threshold, namely β) improves its well–being;
(iii) the population is scared of having a large number of infected people.
8See Section 4.1.3 for a rigorous definition of the set C of admissible fine policies.
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2.3.1 Population optimisation problem
We stylise the previous facts by considering that the population solves the following optimal control problem, for a
given pair (α, χ) ∈ A× C
V A0 (α, χ) := sup
β∈B
E
[ ∫ T
0
u(t, βt, It)dt+ U(−χ)
]
, (2.6)
where u : [0, T ]×B×R+ −→ R and U : R −→ R are continuous functions in all their arguments, and U is a bijection
from R to R. Given a pair (α, χ), the set of optimal contact rates β will be denoted B?(α, χ).9
The functions u and U should be interpreted as functions translating respectively the actual value of interaction from
the point of view of the population, and the disutility associated to the fine. More precisely, the function U is assumed
to be an increasing function, according to (i) above. Concerning the function u, it should be non–decreasing in the
second variable up to β, and then non–increasing, modelling (ii) above. On the other hand, the function u is assumed
to be non–increasing with respect to the proportion of infected individual in the population. In particular, this allows
to take into account both the fear of the infection (as mentioned in (iii) above) and the cost that is incurred if an
individual is infected. From the population’s point of view, this cost is not actually expressed in terms of money, but
mainly corresponds to medical side effects or general morbidity. We refer to Anand and Hanson [7], Zeckhauser and
Shepard [110] and Sassi [94], for an introduction to QALY/DALY (Quality– and Disability–Adjusted Life–Year), the
generic measures of disease burden used in economic evaluation to assess the value of medical interventions.
We choose to normalise the utility of the population to zero when there is no epidemic. In other words, if i0 = 0, then
It = 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ], and thus the utility of the population should be equal to 0. With this in mind, we assume
that U(0) = 0, which means that without a fine, the population does not suffer any disutility. Moreover, when there
is no epidemic, the population should not reduce its social interaction, meaning that for all t ∈ [0, T ], βt = β. This
leads us to assume that
u(t, β, 0) = 0, for all t ∈ [0, T ].
Example 2.1 (Utility functions for the population). As previously mentioned, the function u : [0, T ]×B×R+ −→ R
represents the social cost of lockdown policy, and thus should capture the two rules (ii) and (iii), as well as satisfy
u(t, β, 0) = 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ]. In particular, we could consider a separable utility function u of the form
u(t, b, i) := −uI(t, i)− uβ(t, b), (t, b, i) ∈ [0, T ]×B × R+, (2.7)
where the function uI : R+ −→ R represents the fear of the infection for the population. In order to choose this
function, we would like model the fact that when the proportion of infected is close to 0, the population underestimates
the epidemic, while when this proportion becomes large, the population becomes irrationally afraid. Therefore, we can
consider a function independent of t, and take
uI(t, i) = cpi3, (t, i) ∈ [0, T ]× R+, for some cp ≥ 0. (2.8)
Next, the function uβ represents the sensitivity of the population with respect to the initial transmission rate β of
the disease, i.e., without any lockdown measure. During the lockdown period, the social cost of distancing measures
becomes more and more important for the population, and we thus expect the cost uβ to also reflect this sensitivity
with respect to time. More precisely, we can consider two particular functions to model these stylised facts
(i) either uβ(t, b) := ηpψ(t)(β−b)2/2, (t, b) ∈ [0, T ]×B, for some ηp > 0, to insist on the fact that it is costly for the
population to deviate from its usual contact rate, i.e. its level of interactions in an epidemic–free environment,
inducing the natural transmission rate of the disease β;
(ii) or uβ(t, b) := ηpψ(t)
(
β
ηp
b−ηp − 1), (t, b) ∈ [0, T ]×B, for some ηp > 0, to emphasise that it is very costly, if not
impossible, to reduce the level of interaction between the population to zero, and thus to prevent the transmission
of the disease.
In the two previous forms, ψ is a non–decreasing and convex R+–valued function, to represent the increasing aversion
to the lockdown for the population as time passes. Indeed, the longer the lockdown period, the more sensitive the
population is to the social cost of distancing measures. In other words, deviating from its usual level of interaction
9Once again, the reader is referred to Section 4.1.3, and more precisely to Equation (4.8) for a rigorous definition of B?.
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entails a social cost to the population that is greater as the duration increases. More precisely, we can imagine that
the function ψ takes the form
ψ(t) := eτpt, t ∈ [0, T ], for some τp > 0.
Finally, concerning the utility of the Agent with respect to the tax χ, we choose a mixed CARA–risk–neutral utility
function
U(x) := 1− e
−θpx
θp
+ φpx, x ∈ R,
where θp > 0 is the risk–aversion of the population, and φp > 0, so that U(0) = 0, and U is an increasing and strictly
concave bijection from R to R. For later use, we record that the inverse of U , denoted by U (−1), has an explicit form
(see Corless, Gonnet, Hare, Jeffrey, and Knuth [25] for more details about the LambertW function)
U (−1)(y) := 1
θp
LambertW
(
φ−1p e
1−θpy
φp
)
+ θpy − 1
θpφp
, y ∈ R.
2.3.2 A benchmark case: optimal interaction without taxation and testing policies
Before turning to the principal–agent problem itself, we aim at solving (4.7) for α = 1 fixed, and χ = 0, i.e. without
tax and testing policy. Similar problems have been studied in for instance Kandhway and Kuri [61]. Mathematically
speaking, the optimisation problem faced by the population without contract is informally given by
V A0 (1, 0) = sup
β∈B
E
[ ∫ T
0
u(t, βt, It)dt
]
, (2.9)
since we assumed U(0) = 0. Notice that by assumption on the function u, in the no–epidemic case, i.e., if i0 = 0, the
population should not make any effort, and therefore the optimal contact rate β over the period [0, T ] is equal to β.
We thus consider in the following a fixed initial condition (s0, i0) ∈ (R?+)2, which implies that for all t ∈ [0, T ], both
St and It are (strictly) positive.
Without tax, the population’s problem boils down to a standard control problem, with two state variables S and I.
We will give the associated PDE in Section 2.4.1 below.
2.3.3 Relevant form of tax policy
One of the main theoretical result of our study is given by Theorem 4.7. Informally, this theorem states that given
an admissible contract, namely a testing policy α ∈ A and a tax χ ∈ C, there exist a unique Y0 and Z such that the
following representation holds
U(−χ) = Y0 −
∫ T
0
(
Zt(µ+ ν + γ + ρ)It + u(t, β?t , It)− β?t
√
αtStItZt
)
dt−
∫ T
0
ZtdIt, (2.10)
where β? is the unique optimal contact rate for the population. More precisely, we can state that for (Lebesgue–almost
every) t ∈ [0, T ], β?t := b?(t, St, It, Zt) is the maximiser of the function b ∈ B 7−→ u(t, b, It) − bStItZt. Under some
assumptions for existence and smoothness of the inverse of the function U , the previous equation gives a representation
for the tax χ.
Based on (2.10), the tax χ will be indexed on the variation of the proportion of infected I, through the stochastic
integral
∫ ·
0 ZsdIs, and not on the variation of susceptible S (though it is indexed on S through the dt integral).
Nevertheless, using the link between the dynamics of I and S, we can write a representation equivalent to (2.10)
U(−χ) = Y0 −
∫ T
0
(
u(t, β?t , It)− β?t
√
αtStItZt − Zt(λ− µSs + νIs)
)
dt+
∫ T
0
ZtdSt. (2.11)
Through this equation, we can state that the tax can be indexed on S instead of I. Therefore, given the strong link
between the number of Susceptible and the number of Infected, it is sufficient to index the tax on only one of these
two quantities, and one can therefore choose indifferently to index the tax χ on the variations of I or S.
The reader familiar with contract theory in continuous–time will have noticed that the previous representation for
the tax χ is not exactly the expected one. Indeed, referring for instance to Cvitanić, Possamaï, and Touzi [29] the
contract is usually the sum of three components:
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(i) a constant similar to Y0, chosen by the Principal in order to satisfy the participation constraint of the Agent;
(ii) an integral with respect to time t ∈ [0, T ] of the Agent’s Hamiltonian;
(iii) a stochastic integral with respect to the controlled process, i.e., in our framework, (S, I).
Neither the representation (2.10) nor (2.11) are, a priori of this form. This difference is due to the fact that the
dynamics of (S, I) is degenerated. More precisely, there is a fundamental structure condition in [29] requiring that the
drift of the output process belongs to the range of its volatility. In words, defining for (s, i) ∈ R2+ and (a, b) ∈ A×B,
σ(i, s, a) := σasi
(
1
−1
)
, and λ(s, i, b, a) :=
(
λ− µs+ νi+ b√asi
−(µ+ ν + γ + ρ)i+ b√asi
)
,
the condition assumed in [29, Equation (2.1)] implies that
λ(s, i, b, a) ∝ σ(i, s, a), for any (s, i, a, b) ∈ R2+ ×A×B,
which is obviously impossible here. Therefore, we cannot use directly any existing result in the literature, and we
should not expect, a priori, to be able to obtain a contract representation similar to the one in [29], nor that the
so–called dynamic programming approach will prove effective in our case. Indeed, as far as we know, such degenerate
models have only been tackled using the stochastic maximum principle, see Hu, Ren, and Touzi [56].
However, and somewhat surprisingly, the form we exhibit for the tax is actually strongly related to the usual rep-
resentation. The reason for this is twofold. First, up to the sign, the volatilities in the dynamics of both S and I
are exactly the same. Second, both the processes S and I are driven by the same Brownian motion W . Therefore,
intuitively, in order to provide incentives to the population, the government can afford to index the tax on only one
of the two processes. Mathematically, it is also straightforward to show that given an arbitrary decomposition of the
process Z in Equation (2.10) of the form Z =: Zs − Zi, we have
U(−χ) = Y0 −
∫ T
0
H(t, St, It, Zst , Zit)dt+
∫ T
0
Zst dSt +
∫ T
0
ZitdIt,
where H is the Hamiltonian of the population, and this is exactly the general form provided in [29]. The main
difference is that in [29], Zs and Zi are both uniquely given, while in our representation, only their difference actually
matters. Hence, there is an infinite number of possible representations for the tax χ in our degenerate model.
2.3.4 Government optimisation problem
As already explained, the government can choose the tax χ ∈ C paid by the population together with the testing
policy α ∈ A. It aims at minimising the number of infected people until the end of the quarantine period, and we
informally write its minimisation problem as
V P0 := sup
(α,χ)∈Ξ
sup
β∈B?(α,χ)
E
[
χ−
∫ T
0
(
c(It) + k(t, αt, St, It)
)
dt
]
, (2.12)
where c : R+ −→ R+ and k : [0, T ] × A × R+ × R+ −→ R are continuous functions. The function c denotes the
instantaneous cost implied by the proportion of infected people during the quarantine period, and is thus assumed to
be non–decreasing, while the function k represents the cost of the testing policy.
In addition, the set Ξ takes into account the so–called participation constraint for the population. This means that
the government is benevolent, which translates into the fact that it has committed to ensure that the living conditions
of the population do not fall below a minimal level. Mathematically, the government can only implement policies
(α, χ) ∈ A×C such that V A0 (α, χ) ≥ v, where the minimal utility v ∈ R is given. This is what is encoded in the set Ξ.
Example 2.2 (Cost functions for the government). The function c can be linear to represent the cost per unit of
infected people, or quadratic to highlight the cost induced by the saturation of the health–care system when the number
of infected is too high. Typically, we would take c(i) := cg(i + i2), i ∈ R+, for some cg > cp, to take into account
that the marginal cost linked to the proportion of infected people in the population is higher for the government than
for the population itself. We also point out that we choose a linear–quadratic cost in i for the government, while we
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took a purely cubic one for the population. This choice emphasises that, on the one hand, even for a small number of
infected, the marginal cost faced by the government is not close to 0 (hence the linear term). On the other hand, the
population is more likely to incur very high and lasting costs (loss of revenues, employment, life, ...) when the disease
spreads uncontrollably, when compared to the government which mostly faces pecuniary costs.
Concerning the cost function k associated with the testing policy, we recall that α = 1 means no testing policy, so no
cost for the government. As soon as α is different from 1, the cost has to be higher. We may consider the following
function for the testing policy k, for some ηg > 0 and κg > 0,
k(a) := κg
ηg
(
a−ηg − 1), a ∈ A. (2.13)
This function highlights the fact that it is very costly, if not impossible, to eliminate the uncertainty associated with the
epidemic. Indeed, in a relatively populous country, it seems impossible to develop a testing policy sufficient to know
exactly the proportion of susceptible and infected people.
2.3.5 A second benchmark case: the first–best
Another interesting case to compare our results with, corresponds to the so–called first–best case. This is the best–
possible scenario where the government can enforce whichever interaction rate β ∈ B it desires, and simply has to
satisfy the participation constraint of the population. From the practical point of view, this could correspond to a
situation where the government would be able to track every individual and force them to stop interacting. The
problem faced by the government is then
V P,FB0 := sup
(α,χ,β)∈A×C×B
E
[
χ−
∫ T
0
(
c(It) + k(t, αt, St, It)
)
dt
]
, such that E
[ ∫ T
0
u(t, βt, It)dt+ U(−χ)
]
≥ v. (2.14)
2.4 Main results and comparison
In this section, we present the main theoretical results obtained when the dynamic of the epidemic is given by (2.5).
Recall that, in order to consider the SIS or the SIR model, one has to set respectively ρ = 0 or ν = 0.
2.4.1 The benchmark case
As mentioned in Section 2.3.2, the benchmark problem is a standard Markovian stochastic control problem, whose
Hamiltonian is defined, for t ∈ [0, T ], (s, i) ∈ (R?+)2, p := (p1, p2) ∈ R2 and M ∈ S2 by
HA(t, s, i, p,M) := sup
b∈B
{− bsi(p1 − p2) + u(t, b, i)}+ (λ− µs+ νi)p1 − (µ+ ν + γ + ρ)ip2
+ 12σ
2(si)2(M11 − 2M12 +M22). (2.15)
We then have the natural identification V A0 (1, 0) = v(0, s0, i0), where v solves the associated Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman
(HJB for short) equation
−∂tv(t, s, i)−HA(t, s, i,∇v,D2v) = 0, (t, s, i) ∈ D, v(T, s, i) = 0, (s, i) ∈ DT , (2.16)
where
D := {(t, s, i) ∈ [0, T )× (R?+)2 : 0 < s+ i ≤ F (t, s0, i0)}, DT := {(s, i) ∈ R2+ : 0 < s+ i < F (T, s0, i0)},
for a particular function F defined by (4.4) in Section 4.1. Note that if we consider separable utilities with the form
u(t, b, i) := −uI(t, i)− ηpψ(t)2 (β − b)
2, (2.17a)
or u(t, b, i) := −uI(t, i)− ηpψ(t)
(
β
ηp
b−ηp − 1), (2.17b)
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the maximiser of the Hamiltonian is given by b◦(s, i, p1 − p2) where the map b◦ : (R?+)2 × R −→ B is defined for all
(s, i, z) ∈ (R?+)2 × R by
b◦(s, i, z) :=

βmax, if z < −ηpψ(t)
si
(βmax − β),
β − siz
ηpψ(t)
, if z ∈
[
− ηpψ(t)(β
max − β)
si
,
βηpψ(t)
si
]
,
0, if z > βηpψ(t)
si
,
(2.18a)
or b◦(s, i, z) :=

βmax, if z < ηpψ(t)β
ηp
si(βmax)1+ηp ,(
ηpψ(t)β
η
siz
) 1
1+η
, otherwise.
(2.18b)
In particular, the optimal interaction rate is given by β◦t = b◦(St, It, (∂sv − ∂iv)(t, St, It)), t ∈ [0, T ].
2.4.2 The first–best case
To find the optimal interaction rate β ∈ B, as well as the optimal contract (α, χ) ∈ A× C, in the first–best case, one
has to solve the government’s problem defined by (2.14). Mathematical details are postponed to Section 4.3.3, but we
present here an overview of the main results.
To take into account the inequality constraint in the definition of V P,FB0 , one has to introduce the associated La-
grangian. Given a Lagrange multiplier $ > 0, we first remark that the optimal tax is constant and given by
χ?($) := −(U ′)(−1)( 1
$
)
. (2.19)
Then, defining for any $ > 0
V 0($) := sup
(α,β)∈A×B
E
[ ∫ T
0
(
$u(t, βt, It)− c(It)− k(t, αt, St, It)
)
dt
]
, (2.20)
we have
V P,FB0 = inf
$>0
{
χ?($) +$
(
U
(− χ?($))− v)+ V 0($)}. (2.21)
Note that V 0($) is the value function of a standard stochastic control problem, and therefore we expect to have
V 0($) = v$(0, s0, i0), for a function v$ : [0, T ]× R2+ −→ R solution to the following HJB PDE−∂tv
$(t, s, i) + c(i)− (λ− µs+ νi)∂sv$ + (µ+ ν + γ + ρ)i∂iv$ −H$(t, s, i, ∂v$, D2v$) = 0, (t, s, i) ∈ D,
v$(T, s, i) = 0, (s, i) ∈ DT ,
where the Hamiltonian is defined, for t ∈ [0, T ], (s, i) ∈ (R?+)2, p := (p1, p2) ∈ R2 and M ∈ S2 by
H$(t, s, i, p,M) := sup
a∈A
{
sup
b∈B
{
$u(t, b, i)− bsi√a(p1 − p2)
}− k(t, a, s, i) + 12σ2(si)2a2(M11 − 2M12 +M22)
}
.
In particular, if we consider separable utilities with the forms (2.17), for a given testing policy α ∈ A and a Lagrange
multiplier $ > 0, the optimal interaction rate is given for all t ∈ [0, T ] by β$t = b$
(
St, It, ∂v
$(t, St, It), αt
)
, where
b$(s, i, p, a) := b◦
(
s, i,
√
a(p1 − p2)/$
)
, for all (s, i, p, a) ∈ (R?+)2 × R2 ×A,
recalling that b◦ is defined by (2.18).
13
2.4.3 The general case
Thanks to the reasoning developed in Section 4, we are able to determine the optimal design of the fine policy, the
optimal testing policy, as well as the optimal effort of the population.
First, as informally explained in Section 2.3.3, to implement a tax policy χ ∈ C, the government only needs to
choose a constant Y0 and a process Z. Given these two parameters, we can state that the optimal contact rate for
the population is defined by β?t := b?(t, St, It, Zt, αt), such that the function b ∈ B 7−→ u(t, b, It) − b
√
αtStItZt is
maximised for (Lebesgue–almost every) t ∈ [0, T ].
Remark 2.3. Note that if we consider separable utilities with the forms (2.17), the maximiser b? is defined for all
(t, s, i, z, a) ∈ [0, T ]× (R?+)2 × R×A by b?(s, i, z, a) := b◦(s, i, z
√
a), recalling that b◦ is defined by (2.18).
It thus remains to solve the government’s problem in order to determine the optimal choice of Y0 and Z. The reader
is referred to Section 4.3 for the rigorous government’s problem, but, to summarise the results, the optimal process Z
as well as the optimal testing policy α are determined so as to maximise the government’s Hamiltonian, given by
HP(t, s, i, p,M) = sup
z∈R,a∈A
{
b?(t, s, i, z, a)
√
asi(p2 − p1) + 12σ
2a2(si)2f(z,M)− k(t, a, s, i)− u?(t, s, i, z, a)p3
}
+ (λ− µs+ νi)p1 − (µ+ ν + γ + ρ)ip2 − c(i),
for (t, s, i, p,M) ∈ [0, T ]× R2+ × R3 × S3, and where, in addition for z ∈ R,
f(z,M) := M11 − 2M12 +M22 − 2z(M23 −M13) + z2M33, and u?(t, s, i, z, a) := u
(
t, b?(t, s, i, z, a), i
)
.
Finally, it remains to solve numerically the following HJB equation, for all t ∈ [0, T ] and x := (s, i, y) ∈ R3
−∂tv(t, x)−HP
(
t, x,∇xv,D2xv
)
= 0, (t, x) ∈ O, v(T, x) = −U (−1)(y), x ∈ OT , (2.22)
where the natural domain over which the above PDE must be solved is
O := {(t, s, i, y) ∈ [0, T )× R2+ × R : 0 < s+ i < F (t, s0, i0)}, OT := {(s, i, y) ∈ R2+ × R : 0 < s+ i < F (T, s0, i0)}.
3 Numerical experiments
The results presented in Section 2.4 are quite theoretical: except for the optimal transmission rate, it is complicated
to obtain explicit formulae for the other variables sought, in particular for the optimal testing policy α, even if we
consider separable utility functions as in (2.17). It is therefore necessary to perform numerical simulations to evaluate
the optimal efforts of the population and the government, as well as the optimal tax policy. Given the similarities in
the results between the SIS and SIR models, only those related to the SIR model are presented in this section. The
reader will find in Appendix A the results corresponding to the SIS model.
3.1 Choice of parameters
The following numerical experiments are implemented using the utility and cost functions respectively mentioned in
Example 2.1 for the population and in Example 2.2 for the government. To summarise, we choose
for the population: u(t, b, i) := −cpi3 − ηpψ(t)2 (β − b)
2, with ψ(t) := eτpt, and U(x) := 1− e
−θpx
θp
+ φpx, (3.1a)
for the government: k(a) := κg(a−ηg − 1), and c(i) := cg(i+ i2), (3.1b)
for all (t, x, s, i) ∈ [0, T ] × R × R2+, a ∈ A := [ε, 1] and b ∈ B := [0, βmax]. These functions require to specify several
parameters, provided in Table 1.
Parameters cp ηp θp τp φp βmax
Values 0.5 1 4 0 0.5 0.2
(a) Characteristics of the population
Parameters κg cg ηg ε
Values 0.001 1 0.01 0.01
(b) Characteristics of the government
Table 1: Set of parameters for cost and utility functions
14
In addition, the set of parameters used for the simulations of the epidemic dynamics given by (2.5) are provided in
Table 2 and are inspired by those chosen by Élie, Hubert, and Turinici [38]. Recall that the parameter β denotes
the usual contact rate within the population, before the beginning of the lockdown. In other words, β represents the
initial and effective transmission rate of the disease, without any specific effort of the population. The associated
reproduction number R0, commonly defined by R0 := β/(ν + ρ) in the literature on epidemic models, is equal to 2.0,
and is thus in the confidence interval of available data, see for example Li et al. [70]. Recall that the parameters λ and µ
represent respectively the birth and (natural) death rates among the population, and therefore reflect the demographic
dynamics unrelated to the epidemic, while γ represents the death rate associated to the disease. To simplify, and since
the duration of the COVID–19 epidemic should be relatively short in comparison to the life expectancy at birth,
we choose to disregard the demographic dynamics by setting λ = µ = 0. In contrast, we set γ = 1%, since the
mortality associated with the disease appears to be significant. Finally, recall that the parameters ν and ρ correspond
respectively to the recovery rates in the SIS and SIR models, i.e., the inverse of the virus contagious period. Since
we want to consider here a SIR dynamic, we let ν = 0 and ρ = 0.1, to account for the average 10–day duration of
COVID–19 disease.
T (s0, i0, r0) (λ, µ) γ ν ρ σ β
SIR model (2.4) 200 (0.99984, 1.07× 10−4, 5.3× 10−5) (0, 0) 0.01 0 0.1 0.1 0.2
Table 2: Set of parameters for the simulations of SIR model
When not explicitly specified, the simulations presented in this section are performed with the sets of parameters
described in Tables 1 and 2. However, the parameters used to describe in particular the utility and cost functions
of the population and government are set in a relatively arbitrary way. To actually estimate these parameters would
require an extensive sociological and economic study, that we do not presume to be able to perform at this stage, and
linking, for example, the population’s costs to the DALY/QALY concepts already mentioned, and the government’s
costs to those of the health care system and its possible congestion. Moreover, there is considerable uncertainty in
the medical literature on the choice of all parameters used to describe the dynamics of the epidemic, in particular
because the COVID–19 is a new type of virus and therefore we do not have sufficient hindsight to reliably estimate
its characteristics. It will therefore be necessary to study the sensitivity of the results obtained with respect to the
selected parameters.
Finally, it should be remembered that, in contrast to usual principal–agent problems, the government implements a
mandatory tax, which the population cannot refuse. Nevertheless, we consider that the government is benevolent, in
the sense that it still wishes to ensure that the utility of the population remains above a certain level, denoted by v.
To fix this level, we assume that the government wants to ensure at the very least to the population the same living
conditions it would have had in the event of an uncontrolled epidemic, i.e., without any effort on the part of neither
the population nor the government, meaning β = β, α = 1 and χ = 0. Mathematically, this is equivalent to the
following, since u is separable of the form (2.7), such that for all t ∈ [0, T ], uβ(t, β) = 0 and uI satisfies (2.8)
v := EP
1,β
[ ∫ T
0
u(t, β, It)dt+ U(0)
]
= EP
1,β
[
−
∫ T
0
(
uI(t, It) + uβ(t, β)
)
dt
]
= −cpEP1,β
[ ∫ T
0
I3t dt
]
, (3.2)
Notice that the reservation utility v is given by the worst case scenario, without any sanitary precaution neither from
the population nor from the government. This level may be judged too severe, and one could consider a model where
the government is more benevolent. In particular, one could set v closer to the value that the population achieves in
the benchmark case, i.e., when it makes optimal efforts in the absence of government policy. Nevertheless, the value
of v should not be of major importance, since it should only impact the initial value Y0.
3.2 Numerical approach
In order to solve Equation (2.16) corresponding to the population’s problem in the benchmark case, as well as Equa-
tion (2.22) for the government’s problem, we need a method permitting to deal with degenerate HJB equations. We
choose to implement semi–Lagrangian schemes, first proposed in Camilli and Falcone [21]. These are explicit schemes
using a given time–step ∆t, and requiring interpolation on the grid of points where the equation is solved. This
interpolation can be either linear, as proposed in [21], or using some truncated higher–order interpolators, as proposed
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by Warin [105], leading to convergence of the numerical solution to the viscosity solution of the problem. A key
point here, which makes the approach delicate, is that the domain over which the PDEs are solved is unbounded.
It is therefore necessary to define a so–called resolution domain, over which the numerical solution will be actually
computed, which on the one hand must be large enough, and which on the other hand creates additional difficulties
in the treatment of newly introduced boundary conditions. In order to treat these issues, we use two special tricks:
(i) picking randomly the control in (2.5) for the benchmark case, and in (4.16) for the general case, and using the
forward SDE with an Euler scheme, a Monte–Carlo method allows us to get an envelop of the reachable domain
with a high probability at each time–step. Then, given a discretisation step fixed once and for all, the grid
of points used by the semi–Lagrangian scheme is defined at each time–step with bounds set by the reachable
domain estimated by Monte–Carlo. Therefore, at time step 0, the grid is only represented by a single mesh,
while the number of meshes can reach millions near T ;
(ii) since the scheme is explicit, starting at a given point at date t, it requires to use only some discretisation points
at date t + ∆t, and a modification of the general scheme is implemented to use only points inside the grid at
date t+ ∆t, as shown in [105].
Lastly, in dimension 3 or above, parallelisation techniques defined in [105] have to be used in order to accelerate the
resolution of the problems. The numerical results below are obtained using the StOpt library, see Gevret, Langrené,
Lelong, Warin, and Maheshwari [43].
3.3 The benchmark case
We first focus on the benchmark case, when the government does not implement any particular policy to tackle the
epidemic, i.e., α = 1 and χ = 0. Recall that in this case, the population’s problem is given by (2.9), and is then
equivalent to solving the HJB equation (2.16).
For our simulations, we choose a number of time–steps equal to 200, and a discretisation step equal to 0.0025. The
interpolator is chosen linear, and the optimal command b◦ used to maximise the Hamiltonian is discretised with
200 points given a step discretisation of 0.005. Once the PDE is solved, a forward Euler scheme is used to obtain
trajectories of the optimally controlled S and I, meaning with the optimal transmission rate b◦. In order to check the
accuracy of the method described in Section 3.2, we implement two versions of the resolution
(i) the first version is a direct resolution of (2.16) with the Hamiltonian (2.15);
(ii) the second one relies on a change of variable. More precisely, we consider (s, x := (s + i)) as state variables,
instead of (s, i), and then solve the problem (2.16), but with a slightly modified Hamiltonian to take into account
this change of variable
H˜A(t, s, x, p,M) := sup
b∈B
{− bs(x− s)p1 + u(t, b, x− s)}+ (λ− (µ+ ν)s+ νx)p1
+ (λ− (µ+ γ + ρ)x+ (γ + ρ)s)p2 + 12σ
2(s(x− s))2M11.
The advantage of the second representation is that the dispersion of It + St is zero and thus smaller than the one of
It, leading to the use of grids with a smaller number of points.
First, to give an overview of the overall trend, we plot, on Figure 3, 100 trajectories of the optimal interaction rate β?,
and the associated proportions St and It of susceptible and infected, using the resolution method (i) mentioned above,
i.e., with state variables (S, I). For more accurate trajectories, we compare on Figure 4 two different trajectories of the
optimal interaction rate β?, together with the corresponding dynamic of the proportion I of infected. For these two
simulations, we compare the results given by the two aforementioned methods. More precisely, while the blue curve
is obtained through the direct resolution, the orange one results from the second method, i.e., with state variables
(S, S − I). Finally, on Figures 5 and 6, we test the influence of the parameter τp by setting τp = 0.01, instead of 0.
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Optimal effort β? Proportion I of infected Proportion S of susceptible
Figure 3: 100 simulations with respect to time of the SIR model in the benchmark case.
Voluntary lockdown of the population. As expected, the optimal behaviour β? is to start close to β, then we
note that β? decreases as the disease spreads in the population. More specifically, two waves of effort can be observed:
the first one delays the acceleration of the epidemic, and the second, generally more significant, takes place during the
peak of the epidemic. Approaching the fixed maturity, individuals come back to their usual behaviour β. However,
even if the population chooses to decrease the interaction rate among individuals, the range of β? stays quite small
with minimum 0.16 and maximum β = 0.2.
Optimal effort
% of infected
Simulation 1 Simulation 2
Figure 4: The optimal transmission rate β and the resulting proportion I in the benchmark case
Comparison between of the two methods aforementioned on two simulations.
17
Sensitivity with respect to the method. As we can notice in Figure 4 (top), the optimal effort obtained for
these two simulations exhibits the same features as those previously described. Moreover, the blue curve and the
orange curve, representing respectively the results of the two aforementioned methods, are very close, except at the
beginning of the time interval, probably because of the very small initial value i0. Nevertheless, we can see on the
bottom graphs that the two methods lead to the same dynamic for the proportion of infected, since the two curves,
blue and orange, are almost superposed. Therefore, a small error on the computation of the optimal effort at the
beginning does not impact the optimally controlled trajectories of I. The resolution with respect to (s, s + i) seems
to be more regular, and may give a command closer to the analytical one.
The fear of the infection is not enough. Without a proper government policy to encourage the lockdown, the
natural reduction of the interaction rate among individuals is not sufficient to contain the disease, so that it spreads
with a high infection peak, up to 0.175. As a result, even if at the end of the time interval under consideration, the
epidemic appears to be over, between 60 and 80% of the population has been contaminated by the virus, since the
proportion S at time T = 200 lies between 0.2 and 0.4. In conclusion, without some governmental measures, the fear
of the epidemic is not sufficient to encourage the population to make sufficient effort, in order to significantly reduce
the rate of transmission of the disease. The introduction by the government of an effective lockdown policy together
with an active testing policy should improve the results of the benchmark case, in particular by reducing the peak of
infection and the total number of infected people over the considered period.
Optimal effort
% of infected
Simulation 1 Simulation 2
Figure 5: The optimal transmission rate β and the resulting proportion I with τp = 0.01
Comparison between of the two methods on two simulations.
The lockdown fatigue. By setting τp = 0.01 instead of 0, the cost of the lockdown from the population’s point of
view is now increasing with time. This allows to take into account the possible fatigue the population may suffer if the
lockdown continues for too long. As expected, by comparing Figures 3 and 6, the impatience of the population, gives
higher values of optimal interaction rate β. Moreover, comparing Figures 4 and 5, we can see that in both simulations,
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the second wave of effort is of course more impacted (i.e., the contact rate is less reduced) by the impatience of the
population than the first one.
Optimal control β? Proportion I of infected % S of susceptible
Figure 6: 100 simulations of the SIR model in the benchmark case with τp = 0.01
3.4 Lockdown policy, without testing
We focus in this section on the tax policy, by assuming that A = {1}. In words, we assume that the government
does not implement a specific testing policy, which means α = 1 as in the benchmark case, but only encourages
the population to lockdown through the tax policy χ. In such a situation, i.e., without a proper testing policy, the
detection and hence the isolation of ill people becomes very intricate. The only possibility to regain control of the
epidemic was to reduce the interaction rate of the population.
This case is interesting, as it corresponds to the lockdown policy that most of western countries have implemented in
2020, when faced with the COVID–19 disease, while a very small number of tests was available. Indeed, most countries
put in place systems of fines, or even prison sentences, to incentivise people to lockdown. Although the penalties for
non–compliance are not as sophisticated as in our model, most governments did adapt the level of penalties according
to the stage of the epidemic: higher fines during periods of strict lockdown (hence at the peak of the epidemic), or in
case of recidivism, for example. This reflects the adjustment of sanctions in many countries according to the health
situation, and therefore a notion of dynamic adaptation to circumstances, which is exactly what is suggested by our
tax system. Though it is clear that our model is different from reality, since we consider a fine/compensation, paid
at some terminal time T , and equal for each individual, whereas in most countries, the fine is paid by a particular
individual who has not complied with the injunctions, we still believe it allows to highlight sensible guidelines.
The numerical approach is highly similar to the method used to solve the benchmark case. One difference is that we
have to estimate the reservation utility of the population, namely v, given by (3.2). Using a Monte–Carlo method and
an Euler scheme with a time–discretisation of 200 time–steps and 106 trajectories, we obtain an approximated value
v = −0.02937. Then, we can solve (2.22) through the aforementioned semi–Lagrangian scheme, with 200 time steps,
as well as a step discretisation for the grid in (s, i, y) corresponding to (0.0025, 0.0025, 0.005), leading to a number of
meshes at maturity equal to 250× 70× 800 (for Zmax = 30).
A last technical point concerning the domain of the control Z. Although this control of the government, used to index
the tax on the proportion of infected, can take high values, we have to bound its domain in order to perform the
numerical simulations. We choose to restrict its domain to an interval [−Zmax, Zmax], and consider a discretisation
step equal to 0.5. One would naturally expect that a larger choice would lead to somewhat better solutions. However,
this neglects a fundamental numerical issue: large values of Z increase the numerical cost, as they enlarge the volatility
of the process Y (given by σZIS). As such, since the volatility cone becomes larger, it is necessary to sample a much
larger grid in order to be able to cover the region were Y will most likely take its values. Too large values of Zmax
therefore become numerically intractable, unless one is willing to sacrifice accuracy. A balance need to be struck,
which is why we capped Zmaz at 30. A sensitivity analysis with respect to variations of Zmax is provided in Figure 8.
Though the trajectories of the optimal Z are somewhat impacted, Figure 7 confirms that this is minimal impact on
the trajectories of I itself. Indeed, for different values for Zmax, the shape of the parameter Z remains the same. More
importantly, we will see that the paths of the optimal transmission rate, namely β?, associated to different Zmax, are
almost superposed. As a consequence, the dynamic of I also follows almost the same paths independently of Zmax.
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First, we present in Figure 7 different trajectories of the proportion I of infected when the government implements
the optimal tax policy, and compare it to the trajectories obtained in the benchmark case. As mentioned before, we
also want to study the sensibility with respect to the arbitrary bound Zmax, and we thus represent the paths of I in
three cases, in addition to the benchmark case: for Zmax = 10 (orange curves), Zmax = 20 (green), and Zmax = 30
(red). Then, the corresponding simulations of the optimal control Z of the government, used to index the tax on the
proportion of infected, is given in Figure 8. We compare optimal controls β and Z for the tax policy with different
lockdown time period in Figure 9. Finally, Figure 10 regroups the simulations of the optimal transmission rate β?
obtained with the tax policy, and compare it to β◦ obtained in the benchmark case.
Simulation 1 Simulation 2 Simulation 3
Simulation 4 Simulation 5 Simulation 6
Figure 7: Optimal trajectories of I without testing
Comparison for different values of Zmax and in the benchmark case.
The epidemic is at best contained, and at worst delayed. Compared to the benchmark case, we observe in
Figure 7 that the optimal lockdown policy prevents the epidemic peak in most cases by maintaining the epidemic to
low levels of infection during the lockdown period. Therefore, the government has more time to prepare for a possible
infection peak after the lockdown, specifically to increase hospital capacity and provide safety equipment (surgical
masks, hydro–alcoholic gel, respirators...). The government can also use this time to fund the development of tests to
detect the virus, as well as the research on a vaccine or a remedy for the related disease.
Nevertheless, we can see that at the end of the lockdown period, in many cases the virus is not exterminated and
the epidemic may even restart. This is particularly well illustrated by Figure 11, representing 500 trajectories of I,
obtained with the optimal control. Such a phenomenon can be understood as follows: the lockdown slows down the
epidemic, so that a very small proportion of the population has been infected and is therefore immune. We thus cannot
thus rely on herd immunity, which is reached if at least 50% of the population has been contaminated, to prevent a
resurgence of the epidemic. Consequently, this lockdown policy is a powerful leverage to control an epidemic, but this
tool needs to be supplemented by alternative policies, such as those mentioned above, in order to be fully effective. If
the time saved through lockdown is not exploited, it will have no impact on the final consequences of the epidemic,
measured by the economic and social cost associated with the total number of people infected and deceased during
the total duration of the epidemic.
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Simulation 1 Simulation 2 Simulation 3
Simulation 4 Simulation 5 Simulation 6
Figure 8: Optimal trajectories of the control Z without testing.
Comparison for different values of Zmax, with A = {1}.
Policy implications By comparing the graphs in Figure 8, we first remark that the shape of the optimal indexation
parameter rate Z remains the same, regardless of the simulation and the value of Zmax. The control takes the most
negative value possible (−Zmax) for about 20 days, then increases almost instantaneously to reach the maximum value
Zmax, before slowly decreasing to 0. Therefore, the optimal tax scheme set by the government is as follows. First,
at the beginning of the epidemic, it seems optimal to give to the population a compensation (corresponding to a
negative tax) as maximal as possible, by setting Z = −Zmax. Though this may be a numerical artefact, given that
the initial values of I and its variations are extremely low, the fact that the same phenomenon appeared in virtually
all our simulations tends to show that it is actually significant. We interpret this as a the government anticipating
the negative consequences of the lockdown policy by immediately providing monetary relief to the population. This
is exactly what happened in several countries, for instance in the USA with stimulus checks sent to every citizen, and
our model endogenously reproduces this aspect. Policy–wise, it also shows that maximum efficiency for such stimulus
packages is attained when they are provided to the population as early as possible. After this initial phase, when the
epidemic spreads among the population, the government suddenly increases Z, so that the tax becomes positive and
is in fact maximum, in order to deter people from interacting.
Approaching the maturity, the government eases the lockdown little by little. However, this end of lockdown may be
premature, since we have observed in the previous figures that the epidemic may restart at the end of the considered
period. Indeed, considering a final time horizon is equivalent to assuming that ‘the world’ stops at that time: all
the potential costs generated by the epidemic after T are not taken into account in the model. The government thus
has no interest in implementing costly measures, whose subsequent impact on the epidemic will not be measured.
Nevertheless, this boundary effect has no impact on the previous results and interpretations. Indeed, we remark in the
numerical results that if we consider a more distant time T , the lockdown certainly lasts longer, but follows the exact
same paths during most of the lockdown period, and its release occurs around the same time before maturity (see
Figure 9 below). Moreover, the lockdown period should still end at some time, which is why a finite terminal time is
assumed. This time may correspond to an estimate of the time needed to implement other more sustainable policies
than lockdown, such as the implementation of an active testing policy, or to hope for the discovery of a vaccine or
cure, as mentioned above.
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Optimal β Optimal control Z
Figure 9: Maturity effect for the tax policy in the SIR model
Comparison of the optimal trajectories of Z for T = 200 and T = 250, with Zmax = 30.
Optimal tax sensitivity with respect to the lockdown duration. On Figure 9, we give two trajectories of the
optimal contact rate β (on the left) and the optimal indexation parameter Z (on the right) for two different maturities.
It is clear that both trajectories follow the same paths until some point. Regardless of the maturity, the contact rate β
and the parameter Z have the same characteristics as those shown respectively in Figures 8 and 10. As one approaches
the shortest maturity, i.e. T = 200, the parameter Z decreases towards 0 for the contract of this maturity, while the
other remains at the maximum, and decreases later, as its maturity approaches. Therefore, the fact that Z decreases
at maturity, as mentioned in the paragraph ‘Policy implications’ above appears to be a boundary effect since it is not
sensitive with respect to the maturity.
Simulation 1 Simulation 2 Simulation 3
Simulation 4 Simulation 5 Simulation 6
Figure 10: Optimal transmission rate β without testing
Comparison for different Zmax and with the benchmark case, in the case A = {1}.
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Optimal interaction rate and comparison with the benchmark case. We now explain the general trend of
the optimal interaction rate. In the beginning, recall that Z is negative, meaning that the tax is negatively indexed on
the variation of I. In other words, since I is globally (but very slightly) increasing at the beginning of the epidemic,
the compensation increases with I, which means that the population is not incentivised at all to decrease their contact
rate, and thus the transmission rate of the virus, which remains equal to the initial level β. Then, as the epidemic
spreads, Z becomes very high, which now incentivises the population to reduce the transmission rate below β. Finally,
near the end of the lockdown period, Z plunges to zero, which naturally implies that the optimal contact rate β? goes
back to its usual level β. By comparing with the benchmark case, we see that the tax policy succeeds in reducing
significantly the interaction rate. As a consequence, and as we have seen in Figure 7, the tax policy contains the
spread of the disease during the considered time period, unlike in the case without intervention of the government.
Contract case Benchmark case
Figure 11: 500 simulations of the proportion I of infected in the SIR model
Comparison between the case with tax policy (but without testing) on the left and the benchmark case on the right.
3.5 Tax policy with testing
In this section, we now study the case where the government can implement an active testing policy, in addition to the
incentive policy for lockdown, to contain the spread of the epidemic. This policy is similar to the one adopted by most
European governments in June 2020, after relatively strict containment periods and at a time when the COVID–19
epidemic seemed to be under control. Indeed, the lockdown periods in Europe have generally made it possible to
delay the epidemic, and thus to give public authorities time to prepare a meaningful testing policy by developing and
increasing the number of available tests.
This testing policy has two major interests. First, it allows the identification of clusters, and therefore provides a more
precise knowledge of the dynamics of the epidemic in real time on the different territories. Second, by identifying
infected people, we can force them to remain isolated, in order to avoid the contamination of their relatives. This policy
therefore constitutes another leverage, in addition to containment, to reduce the contact rate within the population.
Thus, by developing a robust testing policy, public authorities can in fact relax the lockdown while keeping the rate of
disease transmission at a sufficiently low level. Therefore, comparing with the no–testing policy case, we expect that
(i) the government will be able to control the epidemic at least as well as with just the lockdown policy;
(ii) it will allow the population to regain a contact rate closer to the desired and initial level β.
To study the optimal testing policy α?, taking values in A := [ε, 1], we consider the cost of effort k given by (3.1b).
This cost function emphasises the fact that testing the entire population every day is inconceivable, and therefore
results in an explosion of cost when α takes values close to 0. Recall that the parameters for the function k, namely
κg and ηg are given in Table 1b. Finally, A is discretised with a step equal to 0.05 and we consider Zmax = 30.
As we can see from the six selected simulations below, the control Z is very regular (see Figure 12), while the control
α is less regular and concentrated at the heart of the epidemic (see Figure 13). Figure 16 gives a global overview of
the 500 simulations, which confirms the intuition given by the six selected ones.
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Simulation 1 Simulation 2 Simulation 3
Simulation 4 Simulation 5 Simulation 6
Figure 12: Optimal trajectories of Z with testing policy.
Simulation 1 Simulation 2 Simulation 3
Simulation 4 Simulation 5 Simulation 6
Figure 13: Optimal trajectories of the testing policy α
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Simulation 1 Simulation 2 Simulation 3
Simulation 4 Simulation 5 Simulation 6
Figure 14: Optimal effective transmission rate β
√
α with testing policy
Comparison between the three cases, the benchmark, with, and without testing.
Relaxed lockdown but lower effective transmission rate. First, comparing Figures 8 and 12, the optimal
control Z presents the same shape in both cases, except at the beginning, since now Z is not negative initially. In
fact, in this case, we observe that the government is asking for less effort from the population, and therefore the initial
stimulus mentioned in the paragraph ‘Policy implications’ still happens, but later and for a much shorter length.
Figure 15 also shows that the optimal contact rate is closer to the initial level β, which should induce a more violent
spread of the disease. Nevertheless, the control α, representing the testing policy and given by Figure 13, balances this
effect. Indeed, the testing allows an isolation of targeted infected individual, and therefore contribute to the decrease of
the effective transmission rate of the disease, represented in Figure 14. Therefore, comparing Figure 16 with Figure 11,
we notice that the control of the epidemic is more efficient than in the case A = {1}, since the proportion of infected
is globally decreased.
Optimal contact rate β Effective transmission rate β
√
α
Figure 15: 500 simulations of the transmission rate with testing policy
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Optimal control α Optimal control Z Proportion I of infected
Figure 16: 500 simulations of optimal government’s controls, with the resulting trajectories of I.
3.6 The first–best case
First, remark that, with the particular choice of utility functions, we have
χ?($) = 1
θp
ln
(
1
$
− φp
)
, if 0 < $ < 1
φP
= 2.
Otherwise, if $ ≥ 2, the optimal tax policy is equal to −∞, which cannot be optimal from the government’s point of
view, since it leads to an infimum on $ equal to +∞ (see (2.21)). For each value of the Lagrange parameter, a two
dimensional PDE with a two–dimensional control (α, β) is considered. A step discretisation for the grid in (s, i) is
taken equal to (0.001, 0.001). A = [ε, 1] is discretised with 20 values and the values of β are discretised with 80 equally
spaced values (to reduce the cost of optimisation). We then search for the optimal $ parameter with a step of 0.01
within the interval (0, 2). We obtain in this case an optimal value equal to 0.64 and we give on Figure 17 the results,
which show in particular that the epidemic is controlled in a similar way as in the second–best case, with incentives
and testing policy.
Transmission rate β Testing policy α Proportion of infected I
Figure 17: 500 trajectories obtained in the first–best case.
The shape of the optimal controls β and α, as well as the trajectories for the proportion I of infected, are highly similar
to those obtained in the previous case. The only clear difference is the principal’s value. Indeed, we can compare the
optimal value V P0 for the government in the moral hazard case, to the first best value V
P,FB
0 . Using 104 trajectories and
the previously optimal control computed, we estimate V P,FB0 = −0.249 while V P0 = −0.287. The difference between
the two values, with a relative difference of 15% only pleads in favour of our incentive model: even without being able
to track all the population, governments can achieve containment strategies with very similar levels of efficiency, and
costs which are not significantly higher. This is of course partly explained by the fact that the testing is profitable
both for the government and for the population, as it allows for values of β very close to its usual value β, as shown
on Figure 17.
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4 Incentive policy for epidemic stochastic models
4.1 The stochastic model
4.1.1 Initial canonical space
We fix a small parameter ε ∈ (0, 1) to consider the subset A := [ε, 1]. We then define by A the set of all finite and
positive Borel measures on [0, T ]×A, whose projection on [0, T ] is the Lebesgue measure. In other words, every q ∈ A
can be disintegrated as q(ds,dv) = qs(dv)ds, for an appropriate Borel measurable kernel (qs)s∈[0,T ], meaning that for
any s ∈ [0, T ], qs is a finite positive Borel measure on A, and the map [0, T ] 3 s 7−→ qs is Borel measurable, when the
space of measures on A is endowed with the topology of weak convergence. We then define the following canonical
space
Ω := C2 × A,
whose canonical process is denoted by (S, I,Λ), in the sense that
St
(
s, ι, q
)
:= s(t), It
(
s, ι, q
)
:= ι(t), Λ
(
s, ι, q
)
:= q, ∀(t, s, ι, q) ∈ [0, T ]× Ω.
We let F be the Borel σ–algebra on Ω, and F := (Ft)t∈[0,T ] be the natural filtration of the canonical process
Ft := σ
((
Ss, Is,∆s(Υ)
)
: (s,Υ) ∈ [0, t]× Cb
(
[0, T ]×A,R)), t ∈ [0, T ],
where for any (s,Υ) ∈ [0, T ] × Cb([0, T ] × A,R), ∆s(Υ) :=
∫∫
[0,s]×A Υ(r, a)Λ(dr, da). Recall that in this framework
F = FT . Let M be the set of probability measures on (Ω,FT ). For any P ∈ M, we let N P be the collection of all
P–null sets, that is to say
N P := {N ∈ 2Ω : ∃N ′ ∈ FT , N ⊂ N ′, P[N ′] = 0},
where we recall that 2Ω represents the set of all subsets of Ω, and we let FP := (FPt )t∈[0,T ] be the P–augmentation
of F, where FPt := Ft ∨ σ(N P). We let FP+ := (FP+t )t∈[0,T ] the corresponding right limit. Similarly, for any subset
Π ⊂M, we let FΠ := (FΠt )t∈[0,T ] be the Π–universal completion of F.
Let us now introduce the drift and volatility functions for our controlled model, namely B : R2 −→ R2 and Σ :
R2 ×A −→ R2, defined by
B(x, y) :=
(
λ− µx+ νy
−(µ+ ν + γ + ρ)y
)
, Σ(x, y, a) :=
(
σaxy
−σaxy
)
, (x, y, a) ∈ R2 ×A,
where the parameters (λ, µ, ν, γ, σ) ∈ [0,∞)4 × R?+ are given. For any (s, ϕ) ∈ [0, T ]× C2b (R2,R), we set
Ms(ϕ) := ϕ(Ss, Is)−
∫∫
[0,s]×A
(
B(Sr, Ir) · ∇ϕ(Sr, Ir) + 12Tr
[
D2ϕ(Sr, Ir)
(
ΣΣ>
)
(Sr, Ir, a)
])
Λ(dr, da),
and we give ourselves some initial values (s0, i0) ∈ R2+.10
Definition 4.1. We define the subset P ⊂M as the one composed of all P ∈M such that
(i) M(ϕ) is an (F,P)–local martingale on [0, T ] for all ϕ ∈ C2b (R2,R);
(ii) P
[
(S0, I0) = (s0, i0)
]
= 1;
(iii) with P–probability 1, the canonical process Λ is of the form δφ·(dv) for some Borel function φ : [0, T ] 7−→ A,
where as usual, for any a ∈ A, δa is the Dirac mass at a.
We can follow Bichteler [18], or Neufeld and Nutz [80, Proposition 6.6] to define a pathwise version of the density of
the quadratic variation of S, denoted by σ̂ : [0, T ]× Ω −→ R, by
σ̂2t (ω) := limsup
n→∞
n
(〈S〉t(ω)− 〈S〉t−1/n(ω)), (t, ω) ∈ [0, T ]× Ω.
10Notice that the initial value of r0 of R, which appears in the SIR version of the model, is irrelevant at this stage.
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Lévy’s characterisation of Brownian motion ensures that the process11
Wt :=
∫ T
0
σ̂−1/2s 1σˆs 6=0dSs, t ∈ [0, T ], (4.1)
is an (FP ,P)–Brownian motion for any P ∈ P. For any P ∈ P, we denote by Ao(P) the set of F–predictable and
A–valued process α := (αs)s∈[0,T ] such that, P–a.s.
St = s0 +
∫ t
0
(
λ− µSs + νIs
)
ds+
∫ t
0
σαsSsIsdWs, t ∈ [0, T ],
It = i0 −
∫ t
0
(µ+ γ + ν + ρ)Isds−
∫ t
0
σαsSsIsdWs, t ∈ [0, T ].
(4.2)
Once again, it is a classical result (see for instance Stroock and Varadhan [99, Theorem 4.5.2], Lin, Ren, Touzi, and
Yang [71, Lemma 2.2], or Élie, Hubert, Mastrolia, and Possamaï [36, Lemma 2.3]) that Ao(P) is not empty.
We recall that the term λ ≥ 0 denotes the birth rate, the parameter µ ≥ 0 is the natural death rate in the population
(susceptible and infected), γ ≥ 0 is the death rate inside the infected population. The parameters ν and ρ correspond
to recovery rates, depending on whether we are considering a SIS or a SIR model, see the remark below for more
details.
Remark 4.2. From now on, one should have in mind that
(i) if ρ = 0, the constant ν ≥ 0 is the rate of recovery for infected people, going back in the class of susceptible. This
case corresponds to the classical SIS model whose dynamics are described by the system (2.3);
(ii) if ν = 0, the constant ρ ≥ 0 is the recovery rate for infected individual, going into a class of recovered people,
whose proportion is denoted by R. This case corresponds to the classical SIR model described by (2.4).
It can be noted that our model, which results from a mixing of the SIS and SIR models, can be interpreted as an SIR
model with partial immunisation, in the sense that only a part of the population develops antibodies for the disease after
being infected. Thus, a proportion ρ of the infected moves to the class R, and can no longer be infected. Conversely,
the proportion of the infected who do not develop antibodies reverts to the class S, and can therefore contract the disease
again. This resulting model is similar to the one developed by Zhang, Wu, Zhao, Su, and Choi [111] and called SISRS.
This type of model seems in fact well suited to model epidemics related to new viruses, such as the COVID–19, when
the immunity of infected persons has not yet been proved.
Before pursuing, we need a bit more notations, and will consider the following sets
Ao :=
⋃
P∈P
Ao(P),
as well as, for any α ∈ Ao, P(α) :=
{
P ∈ P : α ∈ Ao(P)
}
. We will require that the controls chosen by the government
lead to only one weak solution to Equation (4.2), and are such that the processes S and I remain non–negative. We
will therefore concentrate our attention to the set A of admissible controls defined by
A := {α ∈ Ao : P(α) is a singleton {Pα}, and (S, I) is R2+–valued, Pα–a.s.}.
Notice that the set A is not empty. Indeed, any constant A–valued process automatically belongs to A, as a direct
consequence of Gray, Greenhalgh, Hu, Mao, and Pan [47, Section 3] or Gao, Song, Wang, and Liu [42, Lemma 2.3].
Notice that for any α ∈ A, we have
σ̂t = σStItαt, dPα ⊗ dt–a.e.
11More precisely, one should first use the result of Stroock and Varadhan [99, Theorem 4.5.2] to obtain that on an enlargement of (Ω,FT ),
there is for any P ∈ P, a Brownian motion W P, and an F–predictable process, A–valued process αP such that
St = s0 +
∫ t
0
(λ− µSs + νIs)ds+
∫ t
0
σαPsSsIsdW Ps , t ∈ [0, T ], P–a.s.
The result for W is then immediate. Notice in addition that since W is defined as a stochastic integral, it should also depend on explicitly
on P. We can however use Nutz [81, Theorem 2.2] to define W universally, as an FP–adapted and continuous process. This requires some
set–theoretic assumptions which we implicitly consider here, see Possamaï, Tan, and Zhou [85, Footnote 7] for details.
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Notice finally that for any α ∈ A, we have
St + It = s0 + i0 +
∫ t
0
(
λ− µ(Ss + Is)− (γ + ρ)Is
)
ds, t ∈ [0, T ], Pα–a.s.
We thus deduce, using the positivity of S and I, that
0 ≤ St + It = e−µt
(
s0 + i0
)
+
∫ t
0
e−µ(t−s)
(
λ− (γ + ρ)Is
)
ds ≤ F (t, s0, i0), t ∈ [0, T ], Pα–a.s., (4.3)
where for all (t, s, i) ∈ [0, T ]× R2+
F (t, s, i) := e−µt
(
s+ i
)
+ λ
(
1− e−µt
µ
1{µ>0} + t1{µ=0}
)
. (4.4)
This result proves in particular that S and I are actually Pα–almost surely bounded, for any α ∈ A. Moreover, if
(s0, i0) ∈ (R?+)2, then for all t ∈ [0, T ], both St and It are (strictly) positive.
Remark 4.3. Note that in the SIR model described by the system (2.4), we have, for all t ∈ [0, T ],
Rt = r0e−µt + ρ
∫ t
0
Ise−µ(t−s)ds,
so that Rt depends only on the observation of Is for s ≤ t. In addition to that
0 ≤ St + It +Rt ≤ e−µt
(
s0 + i0 + r0
)
+
∫ t
0
e−µ(t−s)
(
λ− γIs
)
ds ≤ F (t, s0, i0) + r0e−µt.
4.1.2 Impact of the interaction
The basic model from (4.2) takes into account the testing policy put into place by the government, but ignores so
far the interacting behaviour of the population. We model this through an additional control process chosen by the
population. More precisely, we fix some constant βmax > 0 representing the maximum rate of interaction that can
be considered, and we define B := [0, βmax]. Let B be the set of all F–predictable and B–valued processes. Given a
testing policy α ∈ A implemented by the government, notice that the following stochastic exponential(
exp
(
−
∫ t
0
βs
σ
√
αs
dWs − 12
∫ t
0
β2s
σ2αs
ds
))
t∈[0,T ]
,
is an (F,Pα)–martingale, given that the process β/(σ
√
α) takes values in
[
0, βmax/(σ
√
ε)
]
, Pα–a.s. Therefore, for any
(α, β) ∈ A× B, we can define a probability measure Pα,β on (Ω,F), equivalent to Pα, by
dPα,β
dPα := exp
(
−
∫ t
0
βs
σ
√
αs
dWs − 12
∫ t
0
β2s
σ2αs
ds
)
.
Using Girsanov’s theorem, we know that the process
W βt := Wt +
∫ t
0
βs
σ
√
αs
ds, t ∈ [0, T ], (4.5)
is an (F,Pα,β)–Brownian motion, and we have
St = s0 +
∫ t
0
(
λ− µSs + νIs − βs√αsSsIs
)
ds+
∫ t
0
σαsSsIsdW βs , t ∈ [0, T ],
It = i0 −
∫ t
0
(
(µ+ ν + γ + ρ)Is − βs√αsSsIs
)
ds−
∫ t
0
σαsSsIsdW βs , t ∈ [0, T ].
(4.6)
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4.1.3 Optimisation problems
At time 0, the government informs the population about its testing policy α ∈ A, as well as its fine policy χ, which
for now will be an FT –measurable and R–valued random variable (a set we denote by C). The population solves the
following optimal control problem
V A0 (α, χ) := sup
β∈B
EP
α,β
[ ∫ T
0
u(t, βt, It)dt+ U(−χ)
]
, (4.7)
The interpretation of the functions u and U is detailed in Section 2.3.1, where the population’s problem was informally
defined.
For any (α, χ) ∈ A× C, we recall that we denoted by B?(α, χ) the set of optimal controls for V A0 (α, χ), that is to say
B?(α, χ) :=
{
β ∈ B : V A0 (α, χ) = EP
α,β
[ ∫ T
0
u(t, βt, It)dt+ U(−χ)
]}
. (4.8)
We require minimal integrability assumptions at this stage, and insist that there exists some p > 1 such that
EP
α[|U(−χ)|p] <∞, for any α ∈ A. (4.9)
Remark 4.4. Notice that since for any α ∈ A the Radon–Nykodým density dPα,β/dPα has moments of any order
under Pα (since any β ∈ B is bounded and any α ∈ A is bounded and bounded away from 0), a simple application of
Hölder’s inequality ensures that (4.9) implies that for any p′ ∈ (1, p) and any β ∈ B
EP
α,β [∣∣U(−χ)∣∣p′] <∞.
Recall that the government can only implement policies (α, χ) ∈ A × C such that V A0 (α, χ) ≥ v, where the minimal
utility v ∈ R is given. We denote the subset of A× C satisfying this constraint and Equation (4.9) by Ξ.
In line with the informal reasoning developed in Section 2.3.4, the government aims at minimising the number of
infected people until the end of the lockdown period, and we write rigorously its minimisation problem as
V P0 := sup
(α,χ)∈Ξ
sup
β∈B?(α,χ)
EP
α,β
[
χ−
∫ T
0
(
c(It) + k(t, αt, St, It)
)
dt
]
, (4.10)
where the functions c : R+ −→ R+ and k : [0, T ]×A× R+ × R+ −→ R were introduced in Section 2.3.4.
4.2 Optimal interaction of the population given tax and test policies
4.2.1 A relevant contract form
Since the fine policy χ is an FT –measurable random variable, where F is the filtration generated by the process (S, I),
we should expect that in general V A0 (α, χ) = v(0, s0, i0), where the map v : [0, T ] × C2 −→ R satisfies an informal
Hamilton Jacobi Bellman (HJB for short) equation, and as such has the dynamic
dv(t, St, It) = −H(St, It, Zst , Zit , αt)dt+ Zst dSt + ZitdIt,
where the population’s Hamiltonian H : [0, T ]× (R?+)2×R2×A −→ R is defined, for (t, s, i, z, z′, a) ∈ [0, T ]× (R?+)2×
R2 ×A, by
H(t, s, i, z, z′, a) := sup
b∈B
h(t, s, i, z, z′, a, b),
where h(t, s, i, z, z′, a, b) :=
(
λ− µs+ νi− b√asi)z − ((µ+ ν + γ + ρ)i− b√asi)z′ + u(t, b, i), for b ∈ B.
In particular, defining Z := Zs − Zi, we should have
U(−χ) = V A0 (α, χ)−
∫ T
0
H(t, St, It, Zst , Zit , αt)dt+
∫ T
0
Zst dSt +
∫ T
0
ZitdIt
= V A0 (α, χ)−
∫ T
0
sup
b∈B
{
u(t, b, It)− b√αtStIt(Zst − Zit)
}
dt+
∫ T
0
σαtStIt
(
Zst − Zit
)
dWt
= V A0 (α, χ)−
∫ T
0
(
(µ+ ν + γ + ρ)ItZt + sup
b∈B
{
u(t, b, It)− b√αtStItZt
})
dt−
∫ T
0
ZtdIt. (4.11)
Given the supremum appearing above, the following assumption will be useful for us.
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Assumption 4.5. There exists a unique Borel–measurable map b? : [0, T ]× R?+ × R?+ × R×A −→ B such that
b?(t, s, i, z, a) ∈ argmax
b∈B
{
u(t, b, i)− b√asiz}, ∀(t, s, i, z, a) ∈ [0, T ]× (R?+)2 × R×A. (4.12)
Remark 4.6. We would like to insist on the fact that for the SIR model and in view of Remark 4.3, it is not necessary
to consider that the process R is a state variable. Indeed, its value at time t can be deduced from the paths of I until
time t. More precisely, following the previous reasoning to find the relevant form of contracts, one could consider
dv(t, St, It) = −H˜(St, It, Rt, Zst , Zit , αt)dt+ Zst dSt + ZitdIt + Zrt dRt,
where, in this case, the population’s Hamiltonian H˜ : [0, T ]× (R?+)2 × R2 ×A is defined by
H˜(t, s, i, r, z, z′, z˜, a) := sup
b∈B
{
h(t, s, i, z, z′, a, b)
}
+ (ρi− µr)z˜, for any (t, s, i, z, z′, z˜, a) ∈ [0, T ]× (R?+)2 × R3 ×A.
Since the dynamics of R is deterministic and not controlled, a simplification occurs between the additional part of the
Hamiltonian (ρi − µr)z˜ and the integral with respect to dR, which leads to the same form for the utility function as
previously mentioned, i.e., Equation (4.11).
4.2.2 The general analysis
Let us start this section by defining two useful spaces. For any α ∈ A, and any m ∈ N?, we define Sm(Pα) and Hm(Pα)
as respectively the sets of R–valued, FPα+–adapted continuous processes Y such that ‖Y ‖Sm(Pα) <∞, and the set of
FPα–predictable, R–valued processes Z with ‖Z‖Hm(Pα) <∞, where
‖Y ‖mSm(Pα) := EP
α
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|Yt|m
]
, ‖Z‖mHm(Pα) := EP
α
[(∫ T
0
∣∣σ̂sZs∣∣2ds)m/2], (Y, Z) ∈ Sm(Pα)×Hm(Pα).
Theorem 4.7. Let (α, χ) ∈ Ξ. There exists a unique FPα+0 –measurable random variable Y0 and a unique Z ∈ Hp(Pα)
such that
U(−χ) = Y0 −
∫ T
0
(
Zt(µ+ ν + γ + ρ)It + u(t, β?t , It)− β?t
√
αtStItZt
)
dt−
∫ T
0
ZtdIt, Pα–a.s., (4.13)
with β?t := b?(t, St, It, Zt, αt) for all t ∈ [0, T ]. Moreover, B?(α, χ) = {β?} and V A0 (α, χ) = EP
α [Y0].
Proof. Fix (α, χ) ∈ Ξ as in the statement of the theorem. Let us consider the solution (Y, Z) of the following BSDE
Yt = U(−χ) +
∫ T
t
sup
b∈B
{
u(r, b, Sr, Ir)− Zrb√αrSrIr
}
dr −
∫ T
t
ZrσαrSrIrdWr, t ∈ [0, T ]. (4.14)
Since χ ∈ C, u is continuous, I and S are bounded, and B is a compact set, it is immediate this BSDE is well–posed and
admits a unique solution (Y,Z) ∈ Sp(Pα)×Hp(Pα) (in a more general context, one may refer for instance to Bouchard,
Possamaï, Tan, and Zhou [20, Theorem 4.1]). Therefore, using the dynamic of I under Pα, given by Equation (4.2),
as well as the definition of β?, and letting t = 0, we obtain that (4.13) is satisfied. Next, using this representation for
U(χ), notice that for any β ∈ B, we have
EP
α,β
[ ∫ T
0
u(t, βt, It)dt+ U(−χ)
]
= EP
α,β
[
Y0 +
∫ T
0
(
u(t, βt, It)− Zt(µ+ ν + γ + ρ)It − u(t, β?t , It) + β?t
√
αtStItZt
)
dt−
∫ T
0
ZtdIt
]
= EP
α
[Y0] + sup
β∈B
EP
α,β
[ ∫ T
0
(
u(t, βt, It)− βtStItZt − u(t, β?t , It) + β?t
√
αtStItZt
)
dt
]
≤ EPα [Y0],
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where we used the fact that that Z ∈ Hp(Pα), and that the process
Eβ· := exp
(
−
∫ ·
0
βs
σ
√
αs
dWs − 12
∫ ·
0
β2s
σ2αs
ds
)
,
is continuous, and both an (FPα ,Pα)– and an (FPα+,Pα)–martingale (see for instance Neufeld and Nutz [80, Proposition
2.2]), so that for any β ∈ B
EP
α,β
[Y0] = EP
α[EβTY0] = EPα[Eβ0 Y0] = EPα [Y0].
The previous inequality implies that
V A0 (α, χ) ≤ EP
α
[Y0].
Moreover, thanks to Assumption 4.5, equality is achieved if and only if we choose the control β?. This shows that
V A0 (α, χ) = EP
α
[Y0], and B?(α, χ) =
{
β?
}
.
In the previous result, the fact that Equation (4.13) holds with an FPα+0 –measurable random variable and not a
constant is somewhat annoying. The next lemma shows that we can actually have the representation with a constant
without loss of generality.
Lemma 4.8. Let α ∈ A, and fix an FPα+0 –measurable random variable Y0 and some Z ∈ Hp(Pα). Define the following
contracts
χ := −U (−1)
(
Y0 −
∫ T
0
(
Zt(µ+ ν + γ + ρ)It + u(t, β?t , It)− β?t
√
αtStItZt
)
dt−
∫ T
0
ZtdIt
)
,
χ′ := −U (−1)
(
EP
α
[Y0]−
∫ T
0
(
Zt(µ+ ν + γ + ρ)It + u(t, β?t , It)− β?t
√
αtStItZt
)
dt−
∫ T
0
ZtdIt
)
.
Then
V A0 (α, χ) = V A0 (α, χ′) = EP
α
[Y0], B?(α, χ) = B?(α, χ′) =
{
β?
}
.
Proof. The equalities for (α, χ) are immediate from Theorem 4.7. For (α, χ′), we have, using the fact that Z ∈ Hp(Pα),
and thus Z ∈ Hq(Pα,β) for any β ∈ B and any q ∈ (1, p)
V A0 (α, χ′) = sup
β∈B
EP
α,β
[
EP
α
[Y0] +
∫ T
0
(
u(t, βt, It)− Zt(µ+ ν + γ + ρ)It − u(t, β?t , It) + β?t
√
αtStItZt
)
dt−
∫ T
0
ZtdIt
]
= EP
α
[Y0] + sup
β∈B
EP
α,β
[ ∫ T
0
(
u(t, βt, It)− βt√αtStItZt − u(t, β?t , It) + β?t
√
αtStItZt
)
dt
]
≤ EPα [Y0].
Since the equality is attained if and only if we choose β = β?, this ends the proof.
4.2.3 Characterisation of the class of admissible contracts
We introduce the class Ξ of contracts defined by all pairs
(
α,U (−1)(−Y y0,ZT )
)
with α ∈ A, and Y y0,Z a process given,
Pα–a.s., for all t ∈ [0, T ] by
Y y0,Zt = y0 −
∫ t
0
(
Zr(µ+ ν + γ + ρ)Ir + u
(
t, b?(r, Sr, Ir, Zr, αr), Ir
)− b?(r, Sr, Ir, Zr, αr)√αrSrIrZr)dr − ∫ t
0
ZrdIr,
with Z ∈ Hp(Pα) and y0 ∈ [v,∞). We also denote for simplicity P?,α,Z := Pα,b?(S·,I·,Z·).
Lemma 4.9. The problem of the government given by (4.10) can be rewritten
V P0 = sup
(α,Z)∈A×Hp(Pα)
EP
?,α,Z
[
− U (−1)(Y v,ZT )− ∫ T
0
(
c(Is) + k(s, αs, Is, Ss)
)
ds
]
. (4.15)
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Proof. From Theorem 4.7 and Lemma 4.8, we know that Ξ ⊂ Ξ. To prover the reverse inclusion, let us now consider
a pair
(
α,−U (−1)(Y y0,ZT )) ∈ Ξ. We simply need to ensure that −U (−1)(Y y0,ZT ) ∈ C. We have, using the fact that u is
continuous, B is compact, α is bounded below by ε, and S and I are bounded, that there exists some constant C > 0,
which may change value from ligne to ligne, such that
EP
α[∣∣Y y0,ZT ∣∣p] ≤ C(1 + EPα[(∫ T
0
|SrIrZr|dr
)p
+
∣∣∣∣ ∫ T
0
σ̂rZrdWr
∣∣∣∣p])
≤ C
(
1 + EP
α
[(∫ T
0
σαr|SrIrZr|dr
)p]
+ ‖Z‖pHp(Pα)
)
≤ C(1 + ‖Z‖pHp(Pα)) <∞,
where we used Burkholder–Davis–Gundy’s inequality and Cauchy–Schwarz’s inequality. This proves the reverse in-
clusion and thus that Ξ = Ξ.
Next, we use Lemma 4.8 to realise that B?(α,−U (−1)(Y y0,ZT )) = {b?(·, S·, I·, Z·, α·)}, and V A0 (α,−U (−1)(Y y0,ZT )) =
y0, which shows
V P0 = sup
y0≥v
sup
(α,Z)∈A×Hp(Pα)
EP
?,α,Z
[
− U (−1)(Y y0,ZT )− ∫ T
0
(
c(Is) + k(s, αs, Ss, Is)
)
ds
]
.
To conclude, it is enough to notice that the following map
[v,∞) 3 y0 7−→ EP?,α,Z
[
− U (−1)(Y y0,ZT )− ∫ T
0
(
c(Is) + k(s, αs, Ss, Is)
)
ds
]
∈ R,
is non–increasing.
4.3 Optimal tax and test policies under moral hazard for epidemic models
4.3.1 Weak formulation for the government’s problem
Lemma 4.9 states that the problem of the government can be can be reduced to a more standard stochastic control
problem. However, in the current formulation, one of the three state variables, namely Y , is considered in the strong
formulation, while the other state variables S and I are considered in weak formulation. Indeed, the variable Y
is indexed by the control Z, while the control (α,Z) only impacts the distribution of S and I through P?,α,Z . As
highlighted by Cvitanić and Zhang [27, Remark 5.1.3], it makes little sense to consider a control problem of this form
directly. Therefore, contrary to what is usually done in principal–agent problems (see, e.g., [29]), we decided to adopt
the weak formulation to rigorously write the problem of the principal, since this is the formulation which makes sense
for the agent’s problem. We will thus formulate it below, for the sake of thoroughness.12
Let V := R×A and consider the sets V as we defined A in Section 4.1.1. The intuition is that the principal’s problem
depends only on time and on the state variable X = (S, I, Y ). Following the same methodology used for the agent’s
problem, to properly define the weak formulation of the principal’s problem, we are led to consider the following
canonical space
ΩP := C3 × V,
with canonical process (S, I, Y,ΛP), where for any (t, s, ι, y, q) ∈ [0, T ]× ΩP
St(s, ι, y, q) := s(t), It(s, ι, y, q) := ι(t), Yt(s, ι, y, q) := y(t), ΛP(s, ι, y, q) := q.
We let G be the Borel σ–algebra on ΩP, and G := (GT )t∈[0,T ] the natural filtration of (S, I, Y,ΛP), defined in the
same way as F in the previous canonical space Ω (see Section 4.1). Let then MP be the set of probability measures on
(ΩP,GT ). For any P ∈MP, we can define GP the P–augmentation of G, its right limit GP+, as well as FΠ := (FΠt )t∈[0,T ]
the Π–universal completion of F for any subset Π ⊂MP.
12Notice that at the end of the day, this is not really an issue. Indeed, provided that the problem has enough regularity (typically some
semi–continuity of the terminal and running reward with respect to state), one can expect the strong and weak formulations to coincide.
See for instance El Karoui and Tan [34, Theorem 4.5]
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The drift and volatility functions for the process X are now defined for any (t, s, i, z, a) ∈ [0, T ]× (R?+)2 × V
BP(t, s, i, z, a) :=
 λ− µs+ νi− b
?(t, s, i, z, a)
√
asi
−(µ+ ν + γ + ρ)i+ b?(t, s, i, z, a)√asi
−u?(t, s, i, z, a)
 , ΣP(s, i, z, a) := σasi
 1−1
z
 , (4.16)
where u?(t, s, i, z, a) := u(t, b?(t, s, i, z, a), i), for all (t, s, i, z) ∈ [0, T ]× (R?+)2×R. For any (t, ϕP) ∈ [0, T ]×C2b (R3,R),
we define
MPt (ϕP) := ϕP(Xt)−
∫∫
[0,t]×V
(
BP(r, Sr, Ir, v) · ∇ϕP(Xr) + 12Tr
[
D2ϕP(Xr)
(
ΣP(ΣP)>
)
(r, Sr, Ir, v)
])
ΛP(dr, dv).
In the spirit of Definition 4.1 for P ⊂M, we define the subset Q ⊂MP as the one consisting of all P ∈MP such that
(i) MP(ϕP) is a (G,P)–local martingale on [0, T ] for all ϕP ∈ C2b (R3,R);
(ii) P
[
X0 = x0
]
= 1, where x0 := (s0, i0, v);
(iii) with P–probability 1, the canonical process ΛP is of the form δφ·(dv) for some Borel function φ : [0, T ] 7−→ V .
Still following the line of Section 4.1, we know that for any P ∈ Q, we can define a (GQ,P)–Brownian motion WP.
We then denote by Vo(P) the set of G–predictable and V –valued process (Z,α) such that, P–a.s. and for all t ∈ [0, T ],
St = s0 +
∫ t
0
(
λ− µSr + νIr − b?(r, Sr, Ir, Zr, αr)√αrSrIr
)
dr +
∫ t
0
σαrSrIrdWPr ,
It = i0 −
∫ t
0
(
(µ+ ν + γ + ρ)Ir − b?(r, Sr, Ir, Zr, αr)√αrSrIr
)
dr −
∫ t
0
σαrSrIrdWPr ,
Yt = v −
∫ t
0
u?(r, Sr, Ir, Zr, αr)dr +
∫ t
0
ZrσαrSrIrdWPr .
(4.17)
4.3.2 Solving the government’s problem
Thank to the analysis conducted in the previous subsection, the problem of the government given by (4.10) can now
be written rigorously in weak formulation
V P0 = sup
P∈Q
EP
[
− U (−1)(YT )−
∫ T
0
(
c(Is) + k(s, αs, Ss, Is)
)
ds
]
. (4.18)
We then define the Hamiltonian of the government, for all t ∈ [0, T ], x := (s, i, y) ∈ R3 and (p,M) ∈ R3 × S3, by
HP(t, x, p,M) := sup
(z,a)∈V
{
BP(t, s, i, z, a) · p+ 12Tr
[
M
(
ΣP(ΣP)>
)
(t, s, i, z, a)
]
− k(t, a, s, i)
}
− c(i), (4.19)
where S3 represents the set of 3 × 3 symmetric positive matrices with real entries. More explicitly, the Hamiltonian
can be written as follows
HP(t, x, p,M) = sup
z∈R,a∈A
{
b?(t, s, i, z, a)
√
asi(p2 − p1)− u?(t, s, i, z, a)p3 + 12σ
2a2(si)2f(z,M)− k(t, a, s, i)
}
+ (λ− µs+ νi)p1 − (µ+ ν + γ + ρ)ip2 − c(i),
where f(z,M) := M11 − 2M12 +M22 − 2z(M23 −M13) + z2M33, for all (z,M) ∈ R× S3.
We are then led to consider the following HJB equation, for all t ∈ [0, T ] and x = (s, i, y) ∈ R3:
−∂tv(t, x)−HP(t, x,∇xv,D2xv) = 0, (t, x) ∈ O, (4.20)
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with terminal condition v(T, x) := −U (−1)(y), and where the natural domain over which the above PDE must be
solved is13
O := {(t, s, i, y) ∈ [0, T )× R2+ × R : 0 < s+ i < F (t, s0, i0)},
recalling that F is defined by (4.4).
Remark 4.10. Standard arguments from viscosity solution theory allow to prove that V P0 = vP(0, x0) (recalling that
x0 = (s0, i0, v)) where vP should be understood as the unique viscosity solution, in an appropriate class of functions,
of the PDE (4.20). Obtaining further regularity results is by far more challenging. Indeed, it is a second–order, fully
non–linear, parabolic PDE, which is clearly not uniformly elliptic, the corresponding diffusion matrix being degenerate.
This makes the question of proving the existence of an optimal contract a very complicated one, which is clearly outside
the scope of our study. As a sanity check though, we recall that ε–optimal contracts always exist, and can be indeed
approximated numerically. See for instance Kharroubi, Lim, and Mastrolia [66] for an explicit construction of such
ε–optimal contracts in a particular case dealing with the stochastic logistic equation.
4.3.3 Comparison with the first–best case
As already mentioned, the first–best case corresponds to the case where the government can enforce whichever inter-
action rate β ∈ B it desires (in addition to a contract (α, χ) ∈ A × C), and simply has to satisfy the participation
constraint of the population. In order to find the optimal interaction rate in this scenario, as well as the optimal
contract, one has to solve the government’s problem defined by (2.14).
The simplest way to take into account the inequality constraint in the definition of V P,FB0 is to introduce the associated
Lagrangian. By strong duality, we then have
V P,FB0 = inf
$>0
sup
(α,χ,β)∈A×C×B
{
EP
α,β
[
χ−
∫ T
0
(
c(It) + k(t, αt, St, It)
)
dt
]
+$
(
EP
α,β
[ ∫ T
0
u(t, βt, It)dt+U(−χ)
]
− v
)}
.
First, by concavity of U , it is immediate that for any given Lagrange multiplier $ > 0, the optimal tax is constant
and given by (2.19). Then, using the definition of V 0($) for any $ > 0 in (2.20), we have:
V P,FB0 = inf
$>0
{
χ?($) +$
(
U
(− χ?($))− v)+ V 0($)}.
Note that V 0($) is the value function of a standard stochastic control problem. Therefore, we expect to have
V 0($) = v$(0, s0, i0), where the function v$ : [0, T ]× R2+ −→ R solves the following HJB PDE−∂tv
$(t, s, i) + c(i)− (λ− µs+ νi)∂sv$ + (µ+ ν + γ + ρ)i∂iv$ −H$(t, s, i, ∂v$, D2v$) = 0, (t, s, i) ∈ D,
v$(T, s, i) = 0, (s, i) ∈ DT ,
where the Hamiltonian is defined, for t ∈ [0, T ], (s, i) ∈ (R?+)2, p := (p1, p2) ∈ R2 and M ∈ S2 by
H$(t, s, i, p,M) := sup
a∈A
{
sup
b∈B
{
$u(t, b, i)− bsi√a(p1 − p2)
}− k(t, a, s, i) + 12σ2(si)2a2(M11 − 2M12 +M22)
}
.
To simplify, let us consider separable utilities with the forms (2.17). We focus on the maximisation of the Hamiltonian
H$ with respect to b ∈ B, to obtain the optimal interaction rate β$. The maximiser b$ is defined by
b$(s, i, p, a) := b◦
(
s, i,
√
a(p1 − p2)/$
)
, for all (s, i, p, a) ∈ (R?+)2 × R2 ×A,
recalling that b◦ is defined by (2.18). In particular, for a given testing policy α ∈ A and a Lagrange multiplier $ > 0,
the optimal interaction rate in this case is given for all t ∈ [0, T ] by β$t = b$
(
St, It, ∂v
$(t, St, It), αt
)
. We thus obtain
H$(t, s, i, p,M) = sup
a∈A
{
$u$(t, s, i, p, a)− b$(s, i, p, a)si√a(p1 − p2)− k(t, a, s, i) + (σsia)
2
2 (M11 − 2M12 +M22)
}
,
for all (t, s, i, p,M) ∈ [0, T ] × (R?+)2 × R2 × S2, where in addition for a ∈ A, u$(t, s, i, p, a) := u(t, b$(s, i, p, a), i).
Then, the optimal testing policy is given for all t ∈ [0, T ] by α$t := a$(t, St, It, ∂v$(t, St, It), D2v$(t, St, It)), where
a$ : [0, T ]× (R?+)2 × R2 × S2 −→ A is the maximiser of the previous Hamiltonian on a ∈ A, if it exists.
13The boundary of the domain cannot be reached by the processes S an I, which is why it not necessary to specify a boundary condition
there. Notice though that the upper bound can formally only be attained when I is constantly 0, in which case S becomes deterministic,
and the government best choice for α is clearly 1, and its choice of Z becomes irrelevant. In such a situation, we would immediately have
V P0 = v.
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5 Extensions and generalisations
5.1 Diseases with latency periods: SEIS, SEIR
5.1.1 SEIS/SEIR controlled model
We now focus on the SEIR/S (Susceptible–Exposed–Infected–Recovered or Susceptible) compartment model. Again,
the class S represents the ‘Susceptible’ and the class I represents the ‘Infected’ and infectious. The SEIR and SEIS
models are used to describe epidemics in which individuals are not directly contagious after contracting the disease.
This therefore involves a fourth class, namely E, representing the ‘Exposed’, i.e., individuals who have contracted the
disease but are not yet infectious. With this in mind, we denote by ι the rate at which an exposed person becomes
infectious, which is assumed to be a fixed non–negative constant. Therefore, during the epidemic, each individual can
be either ‘Susceptible’ or ‘Exposed’ or ‘Infected’ or in ‘Recovery’, and (St, Et, It, Rt) denotes the proportion of each
category at time t ≥ 0. The difference between SEIS and SEIR models is embedded into the immunity toward the
disease: for SEIR models, it is assumed that the immunity is permanent, i.e., after being infected, an individual goes
and stays in the class R, whereas for SEIS models, there is no immunity, i.e., infected individual come back in the
susceptible class at rate ν ≥ 0, similarly to SIS models. As in the previously described SIR model, we also take into
account the demographic dynamics of the population, through the parameters λ, µ and γ. To sum up, the epidemic
dynamics is represented in Figure 18.
Susceptible Exposed Infected
Death
Recoveryλdt
βtStItdt
µEtdt
ιEtdt
(γ + µ)Itdt
µStdt
ρItdt
µRtdt
νItdt
Figure 18: SEIR/SEIS model with demographic dynamics
Similarly to the previous models, we consider that the dynamic of the epidemic is subject to a noise in the estimation
of the proportion of susceptible and infected individuals. Inspired by the stochastic model in Mummert and Otunuga
[77, Equation (3)], we therefore consider that the dynamics of the epidemic is given by the following system
St = s0 +
∫ t
0
(
λ− µSs − βs√αsSsIs + νIs
)
ds+
∫ t
0
σαsSsIsdWs,
Et = e0 −
∫ t
0
(
(µ+ ι)Es − βs√αsSsIs
)
ds−
∫ t
0
σαsSsIsdWs,
It = i0 −
∫ t
0
(
(µ+ ν + γ + ρ)Is − ιEs
)
ds,
Rt = r0 +
∫ t
0
(ρIs − µRs)ds,
for t ∈ [0, T ], (5.1)
Note that the proportion I of infected and infectious is also uncertain, but only through its dependence on E and the
proportion R of recovery is uncertain only through its dependence on I. More precisely, we assume that there is no
uncertainty on both the recovery rate ρ, the rate ι at which infected people becomes infectious and the (potentially)
rate ν at which an individual loses immunity, implying that if the proportion of exposed individual is perfectly known,
the proportion of infected is also known without uncertainty and consequently the proportion of recovery is also
certainly known. Again this modelling choice is consistent with most stochastic SEIRS models, and emphasises that
the major uncertainty in the current epidemic is related to the non–negligible proportion of (nearly) asymptomatic
individuals. Indeed, an asymptomatic individual may be misclassified as susceptible or exposed.
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5.1.2 The contracting problem
We will now give (informally) the optimisation problems faced by both the population and the government, the
rigorous treatment can be done following the lines of Section 4. The most important change compared to SIS/SIR
models is that the criteria should now depend on the sum E+ I, representing the proportion of the population having
contracted the disease, rather than just the proportion I of infectious people. Unless otherwise stated, the notations
are those of Section 4.
The problem of the population is now
V A0 (α, χ) := sup
β∈B
E
[ ∫ T
0
u
(
t, βt, Et + It
)
dt+ U(−χ)
]
, (5.2)
while that of the government becomes
V P0 := sup
(α,χ)∈Ξ
sup
β∈B?(α,χ)
E
[
χ−
∫ T
0
(
c
(
Et + It
)
+ k(t, αt, St, It)
)
dt
]
. (5.3)
Notice that in the cost function k, we did not replace I by I + E. This is due to the fact that this cost should scale
with the volatility of I + E (see the discussion in Example 2.2), which is still σ2α·(S·I·)2 in the model (5.1).
The population’s Hamiltonian is given byH : [0, T ]×(R?+)3×R+×R4×A and defined, for any (t, s, e, i, zs, ze, zi, zr, a) ∈
[0, T ]× (R?+)2 × R4 ×A, by
H(t, s, e, i, r, zs, ze, zi, zr, a) := sup
b∈B
{
h(t, s, e, i, zs, ze, a, b)
}
+ (ρi− µr)zr − ((µ+ ν + γ + ρ)i− ιe)zi,
where h(t, s, e, i, zs, ze, a, b) :=
(
λ− µs+ νi− b√asi)zs − ((µ+ ι)e− bsi)ze + u(t, b, i+ e),
for b ∈ B. Given the supremum appearing above, and similarly to Assumption 4.5, we make the following assumption.
Assumption 5.1. There exists a unique Borel–measurable map b? : [0, T ]× (R?+)3 × R× a −→ B such that
b?(t, s, e, i, z, a) ∈ argmax
b∈B
{
u(t, b, i+ e)− b√asiz}, ∀(t, s, e, i, z, a) ∈ [0, T ]× (R?+)3 × R×A. (5.4)
Therefore, a straightforward adaption of our earlier arguments will show that every admissible contract will take the
form χ := −U (−1)(YT ) where
Yt := Y0 −
∫ T
0
(
Zt(µ+ ι)Et + u(t, β?t , Et + It)− β?t
√
αtStItZt
)
dt−
∫ T
0
ZtdEt, (5.5)
where β?t := b?(t, St, Et, It, Zt, αt) for all t ∈ [0, T ] is the optimal control of the population. It thus remain to solve the
government’s problem. Unlike in the previous SIS/SIR models, there are now four state variables for the government’s
problem, namely (S,E, I, Y ), whose dynamic under the optimal effort of the population is as follows
St = s0 +
∫ t
0
(
λ− µSs − b?(s, Ss, Es, Is, Zs)√αsSsIs + νIs
)
ds+
∫ t
0
σαsSsIsdWs,
Et = e0 −
∫ t
0
(
(µ+ ι)Es − b?(s, Ss, Es, Is, Zs)√αsSsIs
)
ds−
∫ t
0
σαsSsIsdWs,
It = i0 −
∫ t
0
(
(µ+ ν + γ + ρ)Is − ιEs
)
ds,
Yt = Y0 −
∫ t
0
u?(s, Ss, Es, Is, Zs, αs)ds+
∫ t
0
Zsσ
√
αsSsIsdWs,
for t ∈ [0, T ], (5.6)
where u?(t, s, e, i, z, a) = u?(t, b?(t, s, e, i, z, , i+ e, a), for all (t, s, e, i, z, a) ∈ [0, T ]× (R?+)3 × R×A.
We then define the Hamiltonian of the government, for all t ∈ [0, T ], x := (s, e, y, i) ∈ R4 and (p,M) ∈ R4 × S4, by
HP(t, x, p,M) = sup
z∈R,a∈A
{
b?(t, s, e, i, z, a)
√
asi(p2 − p1)− u?(t, s, e, i, z, a)p4 + 12σ
2a2(si)2f(z,M)− k(t, a, s, i)
}
+ (λ− µs+ νi)p1 − (µ+ ι)ep2 −
(
(µ+ ν + γ + ρ)i− ιe)p3 − c(e+ i), (5.7)
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where f(z,M) := M11 − 2M12 +M22 − 2z(M24 −M14) + z2M44, for all (z,M) ∈ R× S4. We are then led to consider
the following HJB equation
−∂tv(t, x)−HP(t, x,∇v,D2v) = 0, (t, x) ∈ O˜, (5.8)
with terminal condition v(T, x) := −U (−1)(y), and where the domain over which the above PDE must be solved is
O˜ := {(t, s, e, i, y) ∈ [0, T )× R3+ × R : 0 < s+ i+ e < F (t, s0, i0 + e0)},
recalling that F is defined by (4.4). Solving numerically (5.8) is really more challenging since it increases the dimension
of the problem. A numerical investigation seems to be complicated as far as we now, and we left these numerical
issues for future researches.
5.2 Beyond SEIS/SEIR models: a theoretically tractable method
There are of course plethora of generalisations of the models we have considered so far. For instance, in SEIRS (or also
SIRS) models, the immunity is temporary, i.e. people in the class R may come back into the class S at rate ν. Using
a similar stochastic extension of this model, it is straightforward that all our results extend, mutatis mutandis, to
this case as well, albeit with one important difference: the control problem faced by the government now has 5 states
variables, namely (S,E, I,R, Y ). Even more generally, our approach can readily be adapted to compartmental models
considering additional classes: for instance the SIDARTHE (‘Susceptible’ (S), ‘Infected’ (I), ‘Diagnosed’ (D), ‘Ailing’
(A), ‘Recognised’ (R), ‘Threatened’ (T), ‘Healed’ (H) and ‘Extinct’ (E)) model investigated in Giordano, Blanchini,
Bruno, Colaneri, Di Filippo, Di Matteo, and Colaneri [44] for COVID–19. Of course the price to pay is that the
number of state variables in the government’s problem will increase with the number of compartments, and numerical
procedures to solve the HJB equation will become more delicate to implement, and could be based on neural networks.
Appendix.
A Simulations for the SIS model
Similar to Section 3, we present in this appendix the numerical results obtained when considering a SIS compartmental
model, whose dynamic is given by (2.3), or equivalently by (2.5) with ρ = 0.
Choice of parameters. We take the same parameters as for the SIR case to model the preferences of the government
and the population, i.e. the parameters given in Table 1, except for βmax = 0.5. To model the SIS dynamic, we consider
a different set of parameters (see Table 3), in order to obtain the same shape for the proportion of infected at the
beginning of the epidemic in both cases of an SIR and SIS dynamics. This choice is made to model the fact that, at the
beginning of a relatively unknown epidemic such as that of COVID–19, the proportion of infected people is observed
(with noise), but the authorities do not necessarily know whether this disease allows immunity to be acquired.
T (s0, i0, r0) (λ, µ) γ ν ρ σ β
SIS model (2.3) 600 (0.99984, 1.07× 10−4, 0) (0, 0) 0.01 0.04 0 0.1 0.5
Table 3: Set of parameters for the simulation of SIS dynamics
A.1 The benchmark case
To solve the benchmark case, we follow the method described in Section 3.3, although we choose here a number of
time steps equal to 600, a time step discretisation equal to 0.0025, a linear interpolator, and the optimal command β
used to maximise the Hamiltonian is discretised with 200 points given a step discretisation of 0.005. Once the PDE
is solved, a simulator is used in forward using the optimal command and giving the dynamic of the proportion (S, I).
As for the numerical resolution of the benchmark case for the SIR model, we implement two versions of the resolution,
with variables (S, I) or (S, S + I).
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Optimal effort
% of infected
Simulation 1 Simulation 2
Figure 19: Two simulations of the SIS in the benchmark case
Comparison between the two methods.
As the numerical results obtained in the benchmark case when the epidemic dynamic is given by a SIS model have
the same characteristics as with the SIR dynamic, we describe the graphs only briefly below.
Figure 19. As in the SIR case, the trajectories of β obtained through the two aforementioned resolutions are rather
close, and the corresponding trajectories for I coincide.
Figure 20. We plot 100 trajectories of the optimal interaction rate β?, the proportion of susceptible S, as well as the
proportion of infected I. The population’s behaviour is similar to the one obtained in the SIR model: first the
population behaves as usual, then begins to reduce β, which finally goes back to its usual values as the epidemic
disappears. Once again that the population’s fear of infection is not sufficient to prevent the epidemic.
Optimal control β Proportion I of infected Proportion S of Susceptible
Figure 20: Optimal trajectories in the benchmark case, for an SIS dynamic.
39
A.2 The lockdown policy without testing
As for the benchmark case, the numerical method to obtain the optimal lockdown policy is similar to the one used
in the case of an SIR dynamics. We only recall here the key points of the method. We first solve (2.22) with the
semi–Lagrangian scheme, taking v given by (3.2) and estimated with a Monte Carlo method, and by using an Euler
scheme with a time–discretisation of 600 time steps and 106 trajectories. The estimated value for v is −0.0878063.
We then take a step discretisation for the grid in (s, i, y) corresponding to (0.0025, 0.0025, 0.005), leading to a number
of meshes at maturity equal to 150× 120× 1200. We consider the bounded set of values [−10, 10] for the control Z,
and a step discretisation equal to 0.5.
The graphs obtained are briefly described below.
Figure 21. We present some trajectories of the optimal controls β and Z, as well as the resulting proportion I of
infected individuals.
Figure 22. We compare on some simulations the optimal transmission rate obtained with the contract to the one
obtained in the benchmark case. We see that the tax succeeds in reducing significantly the interaction rate
compared to the no–tax policy case.
Figure 23. As a consequence, we see through different simulations of the trajectory of the proportion of infected
I that a tax policy contains the spreading of the disease along the considered time period, contrary to the
benchmark case. The optimal control thus allows to limit the high values of I.
Optimal transmission rate β Optimal control Z Proportion I of infected
Figure 21: 500 trajectories of optimal β, Z and I, without testing policy
Simulation 1 Simulation 2 Simulation 3
Figure 22: Trajectories of the optimal transmission rate without testing policy
Comparison with the benchmark case.
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Simulation 1 Simulation 2 Simulation 3
Figure 23: Trajectories of I resulting from optimal lockdown without testing policy
Comparison with the benchmark case.
A.3 The testing policy
Due to the larger terminal time horizon, the computation time is particularly significant. To reduce it, the discretisation
used to find the optimal control Z is reduced to 1. The resulting graphs are briefly described below.
Figure 24. We present trajectories of the optimal controls β, α and Z, and the resulting proportion I of infected.
Figure 25. We compare on simulations the optimal proportion of infected with the two previous cases (benchmark
case and only tax policy): with testing, the epidemic is now totally under control.
Figure 26. We present simulations of the optimal effective transmission rate in this case, and compare it to the
optimal β obtained in the benchmark case and without testing policy.
Figure 27. We present simulations of the optimal α: its quick variations explain the swift changes in the effective β.
Optimal contact rate β Optimal testing policy α Optimal control Z Proportion I of infected
Figure 24: 500 optimal trajectories of β, α, Z, and I, with testing policy
Simulation 1 Simulation 2 Simulation 3
Figure 26: Optimal effective transmission rate β
√
α, compared to the previous cases.
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Simulation 1 Simulation 2 Simulation 3
Figure 25: Optimal trajectories of I with and without testing, as well as in the benchmark case.
Simulation 1 Simulation 2 Simulation 3
Figure 27: Optimal trajectories of the testing policy α
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